Node replica detection in wireless sensor networks by Mishra, Alekha Kumar
Node Replica Detection
in
Wireless Sensor Networks
Alekha Kumar Mishra
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela, Odisha 769008, India

Node Replica Detection
in
Wireless Sensor Networks
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Alekha Kumar Mishra
(509CS103)
under the guidance of
Dr. Ashok Kumar Turuk
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela, Odisha 769008, India

Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela,
Rourkela - 769008, India.
Certificate
This is to certify that the thesis entitled Node Replica Detection in Wireless
Sensor Networks, submitted by Alekha Kumar Mishra, a Research Scholar, in
the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Institute of Tech-
nology Rourkela, Rourkela, India, for the award of the degree of Doctor of Phi-
losophy, is a record of an original research work carried out by him under my
supervision and guidance. The thesis fulfills all requirements as per the regulations
of this Institute and in my opinion has reached the standard needed for submission.
Neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted for any degree or academic
award elsewhere.
Ashok Kumar Turuk

Acknowledgments
First, and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Ashok Kumar Turuk
for giving me the guidance, encouragement, counsel throughout my research and
painstakingly reading my reports. Without his invaluable advice and assistance it
would not have been possible for me to complete this thesis.
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Bibhudatta Sahoo and Prof. Ratnakar
Dash, who was constant source of encouragement to me and helping me with his
insightful comments.
I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Prof. G. K. Panda, HOD
Dept. of Mathematics for providing mathematical support at the initial stage of
my research.
I also thank Prof. B. Majhi, Prof. P. M. Khilar, Prof. S. K. Patra, and Prof. K.
C. Pati for serving on my Doctoral Scrutiny Committee.
I wish to thank all Faculty and staff of the CSE Department for their sympathetic
cooperation.
I thank my fellow researchers Ashis, Arunanshu, Rahul, and Sambit who made my
stay at NIT Rourkela a memorable one.
Finally, I would like to thank all of them whose names are not mentioned here but
have helped me in any way to accomplish the work.
Alekha Kumar Mishra

Abstract
In various applications of wireless sensor network, nodes are mostly deployed
unattended and unsupervised in hostile environment. They are exposed to various
kinds of security threat, and node replication attack is one among them. In this at-
tack, an adversary captures a legitimate node from the network. Then, she creates
a number of clones of the original node, and deploys them back into the network.
The adversary can gain control of various network activities and launch other insider
attacks using these replicas. Most of the replica detection schemes reported in the
literature are centralized and location dependent. Centralized schemes are vulner-
able to a single point of failure. Forwarding location information incurs additional
overhead in location dependent schemes.
Most replica detection schemes require exchange of membership information
among nodes. To reduce communication overhead we propose two techniques called
transpose bit-pair coding (TBC), and sub-mat coding (SMC) for efficient exchange of
group membership information among the nodes in wireless sensor network. These
schemes are lossless and do not generate false positive. Next, we propose two replica
detection schemes for static wireless sensor networks called zone-based node replica
detection (ZBNRD), and node coloring based replica detection (NCBRD). In ZB-
NRD, nodes are divided into a number of zones. Each zone has a zone-leader, who is
responsible for detecting replica. ZBNRD is compared with a few existing schemes
such as LSM, P-MPC, SET and RED. It is observed that ZBNRD has higher detec-
tion probability and lower communication cost. In NCBRD, each node is assigned
with a color (value), which is unique within its neighborhood. A color conflict within
the neighborhood of a node is detected as a replica. The performance of NCBRD is
compared with LSM, SET, and RED. It is found that NCBRD has higher detection
probability than the above schemes and lower communication overhead than LSM
and RED. The techniques for replica detection in static wireless sensor networks
cannot be applied to mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSN) because of nodes
mobility. We propose a technique called energy based replica detection (EBRD) for
MWSN. In EBRD, the residual energy of a node is used to detect replicas. Each
node in the network monitors and is monitored by a set of nodes. Conflict in the
timestamp-residual energy pair of a node is detected as replica. EBRD is compared
with two existing schemes EDD, and MTLSD. It is found that EBRD has excellent
detection probability in comparison to EDD and MTLSD, and the communication
overhead of EBRD is higher than EDD and lower than MTLSD. Simulations were
performed using Castalia simulator.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN) [1, 2] is an emerging technology that provides a
new paradigm for computation and communication. It consists of large number of
autonomous sensing devices that are responsible for monitoring the physical and/or
environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity, sound, pressure, motion,
vibration, pollution etc. of a target area. Data collected by these sensing devices
are transmitted to the destination called sink or base station. Usually, the base
station have higher computation and communication capability. Sensing devices
co-ordinate among themselves to carry out a given task. An example of a WSN is
shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: An example of wireless sensor network.
2 Introduction
1.1 Characteristics of WSN
Sensor networks are usually designed and deployed for a specific application. They
are scalable with a minimal effort. Network topology changes frequently in WSN
due to energy depletion, channel fading, node failure and damage. Sensor nodes
are self configurable and they are densely deployed in the target area. Battery is
the only source of energy for most of the sensing devices. Most of the applications
of WSN are data centric and the data-flows within the network obey many-to-one
traffic pattern. Due to higher node density, data redundancy may exist in the
network.
1.2 WSN Architecture
1.2.1 Node Architecture
The architecture of a sensor node is shown in Figure 1.2. A sensor node consists
of four major components: i) Sensing unit, ii) Processing unit, iii) Transceiver
unit, and iv) Power unit [3]. A sensor may also have a global positioning system
(GPS) [4, 5] and a mobilizer for localization and mobility respectively.
Figure 1.2: Sensor node architecture.
Sensor generates analog signal of sensed data, which is converted to digital signal
by the analog-to-digital converter (ADC), and is transmitted to the processing unit.
The processing unit has an embedded micro-controller that performs the computing
job. Transceiver unit is responsible for data transmission. Power unit manages the
power supply to all other components.
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1.2.2 Network Architecture
WSN architecture can be broadly divided into two types [6]: Flat and Hierarchical.
In flat architecture, sensor nodes are assigned with the same task, and all nodes are
equally responsible to perform various network activities. In hierarchical architec-
ture, a group of sensors form a cluster. Each cluster have a cluster-head, who is
responsible for sending data from the cluster members to the sink node. Usually,
a node with lower energy performs the sensing task, whereas a high-powered node
becomes a cluster-head.
1.2.3 WSN Protocol Stack
Figure 1.3 shows the protocol stack of a WSN. It consists of five layers: i) Physical,
ii) Data link, iii) Network, iv) Transport, and v) Application. The functionality of
each layer are similar to the functionality of wireless ad hoc network protocol lay-
ers except the application layer, which includes various protocols to support higher
level operations such as in-network applications, application processing, data aggre-
gation, and external query processing. Protocol stack is also divided into various
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network Layer
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
Power Management Plane
Connection management plane
Task management plane
Figure 1.3: WSN protocol stack.
management planes. Power management plane is responsible for managing the
power level to be used for various operations in a sensor. Connection management
plane is responsible for managing the configuration of a node to establish and main-
tain connectivity. The task management plane distributes a task among the sensor
nodes to improve energy efficiency.
4 Introduction
Various communication standards has been developed for WSN. The commonly
used standards are IEEE 802.15.4 developed by IEEE 802.15 task group 4 [7, 8],
The ZigBee standard [9] which is built on the top of the IEEE 802.15.4, and IEEE
1451 which is the family of smart transducer interfaces [10].
1.3 Applications
WSN supports a wide range of applications [1, 11]. A few of these applications are
described below: i) Habitat monitoring : This includes monitoring of birds and an-
imals, observing the environmental aspects such as marine, soil, atmosphere, forest
fire, and many more; ii) Health-care application: WSN supports patient monitoring
and diagnosis such as monitoring of heart-beat, blood pressure, medicine supply
and doses to a patient, etc; iii) Household application: Sensors can be used in ap-
pliances such as microwave, refrigerator, television etc. to enable remote access; iv)
Traffic monitoring : WSN can be used to facilitate smooth traffic in a city; v) Agri-
cultural application: This involves deployment of sensors in an agricultural field to
monitor soil moisture level, temperature, influence of pest on plant growth; vi) Bat-
tlefield : WSN is used for monitoring enemy activities such as movement of vehicles
and troops; They can be also deployed in buildings, bridges, ships, and aeroplanes
to monitor the effect of load distribution.
1.4 Security Issues in WSN
Wireless sensor networks inherit the security threats of wired network such as De-
nial of Service (DoS) attack, packet dropping, false routing etc. Most of the security
threats of WSNs such as jamming, collision, spoofing, hello flooding etc. [12] are sim-
ilar to that of Ad hoc networks. However, security mechanisms devised for Ad hoc
networks are not applicable to WSN due to the application-dependent architecture
of sensor networks.
In applications, such as military, wild-life monitoring, and traffic monitoring, it
is possible to secure the base station. However, the major challenge is to secure and
protect the tiny sensors that are deployed either in the enemy territory, open space,
or in hazardous areas [11]. As a result, they are more prone to physical attacks and
other possible security threats. A secured WSN must satisfy the following security
requirements [13, 14]:
i) Information confidentiality and privacy,
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ii) Data integrity,
iii) Entity authentication,
iv) Key distribution and management,
v) Secure routing,
vi) Secure data aggregation, and
vii) Intrusion detection.
An adversary can launch various types of attack on WSN depending on its
ability and objective [12, 15]. These attacks can be classified into two categories
[16]: i) layer-dependent, and ii) layer-independent. Layer-dependent attacks are
specific to communication protocol layers. They mostly target a node’s functionality
such as routing, node localization, time synchronization, and data aggregation.
The list of possible layer-dependent attacks on WSN, and their countermeasures
are summarized in Table 1.1. Layer-independent attacks are not restricted to any
communication protocol layers. These attacks can be launched independent of the
communication protocol stack. Two common attacks in this category are the Sybil
attack and node capture/replication attack. The attacks under later category are
more severe than their counter parts.
1.5 Node Replication Attack
The low-cost sensor nodes lack protective shield that would allow unauthorized ac-
cess to their functional units such as memory, processing and communication. It is
infeasible to manufacture tamper-resistant sensors due to cost-constraint. Deploy-
ing such vulnerable sensors in unsupervised environment encourages an adversary
to launch physical attack with a little effort. In node replication attack, an ad-
versary physically captures a node from its deployed location. She then accesses
the memory, processing, and communication unit of the captured node, and steals
relevant information such as identity, secret keys, intrusion detection characteristics
etc. Using the stolen information, she then generates a number of replicas of the
captured node by incorporating useful stolen information, and deploys them back
into the network. These replicas operate under the control of the adversary. They
behave like a legitimate node, and participate in the communication using the stolen
keying materials. The aim of an adversary in node replication attack is to control
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Table 1.1: Security attacks at various layers of WSN.
Layer Attack Countermeasures
Physical
Jamming Spread-spectrum, Low duty cycle
Tampering Self-destruction, Tamper-proof
Data link/MAC
Collision Error correction code
Exhaustion Limited retransmission
Interrogation Accepting limited connections
Unfairness Small frames
Network
Misdirection Sleep mode
Spoofing Authentication, Encryption of important fields
Sinkhole Authentication, Monitoring, and Redundancy
Wormhole Location-based routing, Authentication, Checking bi-directional links
Selective Forwarding Redundancy, Probing
Hello flood attack Authentication, Checking bi-directional links
Transport
Flooding Limiting number of connections
De-synchronization Authentication
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the network activities using replicas. An adversary may either extract useful data
from the network or hinder the network operations. With the help of replicas, an
adversary can launch insider attacks such as wormhole, selective forwarding, hello
flooding, false data injection etc. An adversary can perform all of the above men-
tioned activities only by compromising a single node in the network. Therefore,
node replication is considered as one of the most serious threats in WSN [16,17].
One of the important characteristics that make a node replication attack more
challenging is to differentiate between a legitimate node and its clone1. Since,
replicas execute the same network protocols and have the same keying materials as
that of a original node, they pass all authentication and verification process. Most
of the solutions reported in the literature recommends for the detection of existence
of replicas in the network [18]. These schemes mostly use the parameters such as
position, a unique set of neighboring nodes etc. that can differentiate a replica from
its original node.
1.6 Motivation of the Work
A sensor node deployed unattended in an insecure environment such as in enemy
territory or in a dense forest, is prone to serious threats like node replication attack.
In a node replication attack, original node and its replica behave exactly the same
way. They use the same keying materials and follow the same protocol. Therefore,
it is difficult to distinguish between a clone and its original node. Replica detection
mechanisms rely on the abnormal behavior that would distinguish a replica from its
original node. It is also a challenging task to identify the abnormal characteristics
that will certainly detect a replica in the network.
Replica detection mechanisms must monitor the nodes on a regular basis to
identify the replicas. This requires additional power and radio resources. Since, the
nodes in sensor networks are resource constrained, the detection mechanisms should
minimize resource consumption.
Longer the duration, replicas stay in the network, more damage they can do to
the network. Therefore, a faster replica detection mechanism is desirable.
Deciding the number of nodes responsible to detect replica affects the perfor-
mance of detection mechanisms. A single node such as BS leads to a single point
of failure. Whereas, if all nodes are equally responsible for detecting a replica, then
the communication overhead of the network is increased. Therefore, replica detec-
1In this thesis, the term replica and clone have been used interchangeably.
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tion mechanisms must judiciously select the required number of nodes to detect a
replica. Moreover, all detection mechanism should have low false positive.
This motivates to design an efficient node replica detection mechanism having
higher detection probability, lower detection time, lower false positive, and lower
communication and storage overhead.
1.7 Objective of the Work
Replica detection is a widely accepted approach to handle node replication attack
in sensor networks. An efficient node replica detection mechanism should not only
detect a replica but also optimize the overall network performance. Further, the
replica detection mechanism should emphasize not only on higher detection prob-
ability but also on lower communication and storage overhead. In this thesis, we
have studied the behavior of node replication attack and identified the possible ways
an original node can be distinguished from its replica.
Accordingly, we identified the objective of the thesis as following: i) Propose a
mechanism for efficient communication among nodes, ii) Propose a distributed node
replica detection mechanism for static as well as mobile WSN, and iii) Compare
the performance of the proposed replica detection mechanism with existing ones.
The parameters considered for comparison are: i) Detection probability, ii)
Communication overhead, iii) Storage overhead, iv) Energy consumption, and v)
Detection time. We have simulated the proposed mechanisms using Castalia simu-
lator under Omnet++ environment.
1.8 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized into the following chapters:
In Chapter 2, we have classified the existing clone detection schemes and high-
lighted the contribution of each scheme. We have also made an analysis of the
existing schemes based on their communication cost, message overhead, and stor-
age requirement. A few of the schemes are simulated using Castalia simulator and
their performance is compared.
Chapter 3 proposes two schemes called Transpose Bit-Pair Coding (TBC), and
Sub-Mat Coding (SMC) for exchanging group membership information in WSN.
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The proposed schemes do not generate false positive, and have a lower communi-
cation and storage overhead. We have compared TBC and SMC with Bloom filter.
Parameters considered for the comparison are: i) communication overhead in terms
of number of bits required to exchange the group membership information, and ii)
false positive.
InChapter 4, we propose a location independent zone-based node replica detection
technique (ZBNRD). In ZBNRD, the network is logically divided into a number of
zones. Each zone has a zone-leader, and they share their zone membership infor-
mation among themselves. It is the responsibility of the zone-leader to detect the
clone. The proposed technique is a deterministic one, and found to have a higher
clone detection probability and a lower communication cost in comparison to exist-
ing scheme such as LSM, RED, and P-MPC.
In Chapter 5, we propose a technique called node coloring based replica detec-
tion (NCBRD). In the proposed scheme, each node is assigned with a color (value),
which is unique within its neighborhood. A color conflict within the neighborhood
of a node is detected as a replica. We made a comparison of the proposed scheme
with LSM, SET, and RED. Parameters considered for comparison are detection
probability, communication and storage overhead. We observed that the proposed
scheme has a higher detection probability, and lower communication and storage
overhead.
Chapter 6 proposes a distributed replica detection mechanism called energy based
replica detection (EBRD) for mobile wireless sensor networks. In the proposed
scheme, the residual energy of a node is used to detect replica. Each node in the
network acts as a monitoring node to a set of nodes in the network. A conflict in
the time-residual energy pair of a node is detected as clone by its monitoring node.
We have simulated and compared the proposed scheme with SEDD and MTLSD.
It is observed that the proposed scheme has higher detection probability, and lower
communication and storage overhead.
In Chapter 7 we have summarized the work done, highlighted the contribution
and suggest the directions for possible future work.

Chapter 2
Literature Survey
In this chapter, we made a survey of node replica detection schemes reported in
the literature. We have also classified the existing schemes and analyzed their
communication, storage, and message overhead. A few of the replica detection
schemes are simulated and their performance is compared. The metrics considered
for comparison are: detection probability, detection time, average number of packets
sent/received, and energy consumption.
2.1 Classification
The existing mechanisms for replica detection can be broadly classified into the
following categories:
a) Based on the detection mechanism, we classify into the following types:
i) Centralized: In a centralized scheme, there exists a centralized trusted
entity such as BS, which is responsible for replica detection.
ii) Partially distributed: In this scheme, replica detection mechanism is dis-
tributed in nature. However, the involvement of BS is necessary for
certain activities such as broadcasting a random number, revocation of
message and global keys, etc.
iii) Fully Distributed: This scheme does not require the involvement of any
centralized entity. Nodes cooperate among themselves to detect replica.
b) Based on the need of geographical information, we classify into the following
types:
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i) Location dependent: This scheme uses node’s location information to
detect replica. In this scheme, the location-claim of a node is forwarded
to a set of randomly generated witness nodes/location, or cells, by its
neighboring nodes. Two or more different location-claims for the same
node result in a location conflict, and a replica is detected. Location
dependent replica detection is depicted in Figure 2.1. The nodes denoted
as W in the figure are witness nodes. On receiving the location claim
for node A from two different locations, the witness node W detects it
as a replica. A node can compute its location information either using
GPS [4] or using the mechanisms mentioned in [5, 19].
w
w
A’
A
w
(x,y)
(x’,y’)
<< conflict detected >>
Figure 2.1: Location based replica detection.
ii) Location independent: A location independent scheme does not use lo-
cation information for replica detection. This scheme relies on vari-
ous parameters such as group membership of a node, synchronization
timer/counter value etc. to detect a replica. Figure 2.2 depicts the group
membership based replica detection. In this figure, node is detected as
replica, since witness node W receives different group membership list
for the same node A.
c) Based on the claim forwarding strategy, we classify the node replica detection
schemes into the following types:
i) Deterministic forwarding: In this scheme, a claim received by a node is
always forwarded to its destination.
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Figure 2.2: Group membership based replica detection.
ii) Probabilistic forwarding: In this scheme, a claim received by a node is
forwarded with a certain probability depending on the claim forwarding
strategy.
d) Based on message routing, we classify the node replica detection schemes into
the following types:
i) Link-based routing: This scheme uses Link-based routing protocols [20]
for routing messages in the network.
ii) Geographical routing: This scheme uses Geographical Routing protocols
[21] for routing messages in the network.
Figure 2.3 shows the proposed classification of replica detection schemes.
2.2 Replica Detection Schemes
In this section, we have briefly discussed the existing schemes for replica detection,
with their relative merits and demerits. Notations used in this chapter are enlisted
in the Table 2.1.
2.2.1 Centralized Schemes
SET
Choi et al. [25] proposed a scheme called SET, in which the network is divided into
a number of non-overlapping sub-regions. Nodes in each sub-region are one-hop
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Figure 2.3: Classification of replica detection schemes in WSN.
Table 2.1: Notations
Symbol Meaning
N Network Size
d Average Degree of a node
p Probability of forwarding a message
w Number of nodes (witnesses) that store a location-claim
s Number of sensor node in a cell [22]
t Number of clusters in [23]
g Number of witnesses generated by a neighboring node
vp Verification point used by [24]
neighbor of each other. A leader is elected within each sub-region. Then, a tree is
constructed with the BS as root, and the leaders at different levels in the tree. Each
sub-region leader sends their members identity (ID) to its parent node. A parent
node performs intersection operation between all child sub-regions before forwarding
them to its parent. A non-empty intersection at any level of the tree leads to a
conflict and is reported to the BS for further action. SET has lower communication
overhead in replica detection. However, SET is a centralized detection mechanism,
which is vulnerable to single-point of failure. Size of the member-ID message grows
rapidly at higher levels of the tree close to BS.
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An Area-Based Approach
An area based scheme is proposed by Naruephiphat et al. [26]. In their scheme, a
node having maximum number of neighbors is selected as the central node. Then,
the network is divided into sub-areas. Each sub-area has equal angle around the
central node. A witness node is selected in each sub-area using the method similar to
the one used to select the central node. A node sends its location-claim to the witness
node of its area. If a witness node detects a location conflict, then it broadcasts
a conflict notification to all nodes in the network. On reception of claims without
conflict, the witness node sends these claims to the central node for further detection
of replica at network level. In this scheme, sub-areas can be scaled easily by dividing
their angles. However, this scheme is subject to single-point of failure. Moreover,
the communication overhead is quite high in inter sub-area replica detection.
2.2.2 Partially Distributed Schemes
Real-time Detection Scheme
A fingerprint based scheme is proposed by Xing et al. [27], where the fingerprint of
a node is computed using the neighborhood information. In this scheme, each node
is preloaded with a codeword generated from a superimposed s-disjunct code [28]
prior to their deployment. A node computes its unique fingerprint as well as the
fingerprints of its neighboring nodes using their codeword. The fingerprint of a
node is included in every message that is sent to the BS. Neighboring nodes verify
the genuineness of a node by comparing the fingerprint in the message with their
own record. A conflict in the fingerprint of any node is reported to the BS, and is
detected as a replica. In this scheme, a replica is detected either by the neighboring
nodes or the BS. The generation of codeword from superimposed s-disjunct code is
computationally expensive.
Neighbor-Based Detection Scheme (NBDS)
A neighbor-based detection scheme was proposed by Ko et al. [29]. According to
their scheme, a node moving to a new location must broadcast a rejoining claim to
its new neighbors. The rejoining claim consists of the list of its old neighbors. A
new neighbor on receiving the rejoining claim forwards it to a randomly selected
node from the list of old neighbors. An old neighbor on receiving the rejoining claim
checks for the node ID in its neighbor table. If the node ID is present, then the
old neighbor reports to the BS, otherwise it concludes that the node has moved to
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another location. The old neighbor then sends a challenge to the node to verify its
existence in its neighborhood. If the node is present in the old position, then it is
detected as a replica. On the other hand, if the new neighbors do not receive any
revocation message within a stipulated time period, then, they accept the newly
joined node as their neighbor. This scheme allows occasional mobility of nodes
in the network. However, an intelligent adversary may bypass the replica detec-
tion process. The verification process of the scheme increases the communication
overhead.
Localized Multicast
Zhu et al. [22] proposed a method called Localized Multicast where the witness nodes
are randomly selected and localized to a restricted geographical region. There are
two variations of Localized Multicast: i) Single Deterministic Cell (SDC), and ii)
Parallel Multiple Probabilistic Cells (P-MPC). In their scheme, Zhu et al. have
considered a geographical grid network and divided it into a number of rectangular
cells. In SDC, neighboring nodes forward the location claim of a node to its target
cell with a probability p. A geographic hash function [30] is used to map the node’s
ID to a target cell. The authenticity of location claim is verified by all nodes within
this target cell. On successful verification, each node in the cell caches the location
claim with a certain probability. The claimer of two conflicting location claims is
detected as a replica by a node within the target cell. P-MPC is an extension of
SDC. In P-MPC, the location claim is mapped to a number of destination cells
instead of one. This improves the detection probability in P-MPC. This scheme is
simple and its communication overhead is low. However, the strength of SDC and
P-MPC in replica detection depends on the probability of forwarding the location-
claim to a cell and storing the claim by the cell members.
A Note-Based Randomized and Distributive Protocol
Meng et al. [31] proposed a mechanism that uses a note containing the subset of
neighbors as a claim. The claim-forwarding process starts with the selection of a
reporter node among the neighbors. Once a reporter node is selected, the claimer
requests for a signature note from the reporter node. Upon receiving the signature
note, claimer first verifies and then forwards the claim. The reporter node on
receiving a claim, generates a pre-defined number of witness nodes and forwards
the claim to those nodes. A conflict in the claim of a node at any of its witness
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node is detected as a replica. This scheme has an additional overhead of selecting
reporter nodes. This is because, the trust worthiness of a claim-forwarding node
can easily be verified by listening to its broadcast message. Moreover, the replica
detection depends on the uniqueness of the subset member-list which may not be
ensured in all cases.
Randomized, Efficient and Distributed Scheme (RED)
Conti et al. [32] proposed a scheme called randomized, efficient and distributed pro-
tocol (RED) in order to improve the performance of location-claim based schemes.
In their scheme, a random value is broadcasted to all nodes. Then the nodes dig-
itally sign their location-claim, and broadcast to their neighboring nodes. Each
neighbor generates a number of pseudo-random witness locations using the random
value, their own ID, and the number of witnesses. Then they send the location-
claim to the witness locations with a probability p. Nodes located at a distance
less than a pre-defined value from these witness locations store the location-claim.
A conflict in the location claim is detected as a replica. RED is secured as witness
locations are generated randomly. However, it has limitations in sparse as well as
dense sensor networks. In a sparsely distributed sensor network, a case may arise
where there will be no or limited witness nodes within the predefined range of a
randomly generated location. In such a scenario, the claim may or may not reach a
witness node. This will limit detection probability. In a highly dense network, the
number of witness nodes can be significantly higher. In this scenario, the average
storage overhead of a network increases.
Hierarchical Node Replication Detection Scheme
Znaidi et al. [23] proposed a mechanism for three-tier hierarchical network structure.
Their mechanism is based on the use of Bloom filter [33, 34]. The replica detection
process is divided into the following three phases:
i) Pre-distribution Phase: In this phase, nodes are equipped with cryptographic
keying materials and other parameters required for Bloom filter operation.
ii) Election Phase: This phase is performed periodically to select cluster-head
using Local Negotiated Clustering Algorithm (LNCA) protocol [35].
iii) Detection Phase: Elected cluster-heads exchange their member IDs among
themselves using Bloom filter. A node ID that is found to be a member of
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more than one cluster is detected as a replica.
The memory overhead of this scheme is significantly lower. However, it has an
additional communication overhead in cluster formation. For a small number of
hash functions the false detection probability is higher and requires relatively larger
number of bits in Bloom filter.
2.2.3 Fully Distributed Schemes
Distributed Detection Scheme
Parno et al. [36] proposed two mechanisms which they called: i) Randomized Mul-
ticast (RM), and ii) Line-Selected Multicast (LSM). In RM, witness nodes are ran-
domly chosen. The location claim broadcast of a node is forwarded to a set of
randomly selected witness nodes by its neighbors. If a clone is present in the net-
work, then the location claim of the clone is also forwarded to a set of witness
nodes. According to birthday paradox [37], if each location claim is forwarded to√
N number of witnesses, then at least one witness node will receive two different
location claims, one from the original node and the other from its replica with a
higher probability. This leads to a location conflict and the node is detected as a
replica. LSM has lower communication cost than RM. In LSM, the location claim of
a node is cached at each intermediate node before forwarding to the next-hop node
on the path to the witness node. This creates a line across the cached intermediate
nodes. When the line of a clone’s location-claim crosses the line of its legitimate
node, the intermediate node at the crossing point detects it as a replica. In RM,
the broadcasting of location claim of a node to all of its witness nodes is expensive
in terms of communication overhead. In LSM, nodes that are common to multiple
location-claim lines suffer from higher storage overhead.
Symmetric pair-wise key establishment scheme
Bekara et al. [38] proposed a scheme based on symmetric pair-wise key establish-
ment. In their scheme, each node is associated with a unique generation or group.
The generation of a node can be computed using its ID and a symmetric polynomial.
According to their protocol, only a newly deployed node that belongs to a newly
deployed generation is able to establish a pair-wise key with their neighbors. There-
fore, when a clone that belongs to an old generation tries to establish a pair-wise
key with its new neighbors, it is detected as a replica. This scheme is simple and
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incurs less communication overhead. The duration of a nodes’ generation is a crit-
ical parameter. An inaccurate duration may detect the genuine nodes of previous
generation as replicas.
Distributed Detection Scheme Resilient to Many Compromised Nodes
Sei et al. [39] have proposed a resilient replica detection scheme. This scheme does
not require any trusted entity, and is resilient to a number of compromised nodes
in the network. Each node is pre-loaded with detection process start time. A node
in its turn sends a one-time seed, its ID, and location with a signature to all other
nodes. If a node fails to start the detection process in its turn within a pre-defined
interval of time, then the next node starts its process. To improve resiliency against
node capture, nodes are divided into groups, and each node starts its detection
process using a role ID assigned to it. The neighboring nodes responsible for for-
warding the location claim of a node to its witness nodes are called reporter nodes.
A reporter node forwards the location claim to a number of witness nodes that are
responsible for detecting replica. This scheme incurs significantly higher communi-
cation overhead because, the detection process is based on message broadcast over
the network. Moreover, the scheme does not explain the procedure to ensure that
at least one neighbor would voluntarily become a reporter node.
Memory Efficient Protocols
Zhang et al. [40] have identified two problems associated with LSM protocol; which
they called crowded-center problem, and cross-over problem. To overcome the
above two problems, they proposed the following four protocols: i) B-MEM, ii)
BC-MEM, iii) C-MEM, and iv) CC-MEM. In B-MEM, the location claim of a node
is sent to a random location with a probability of p. A node located closer to
this location, stores the claim. An intermediate node on the path, also known as
watcher node stores the ID and location of the claimer using Bloom filter. Any
location conflict with a stored ID is detected as a replica by the watcher node. In
BC-MEM protocol, the deployment area is divided into a number of virtual cells.
Each node in the cell is associated with an anchor point and an anchor node. The
anchor point is determined using the node ID, whereas the anchor node of a node
is the node, which is closer to its anchor point. In BC-MEM, a location claim is
forwarded from an anchor point of one cell to another cell, which are intersected by
the line segments until it reaches the last cell. The intermediate anchor nodes act
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as a watcher to detect clone. This overcomes the cross-over problem, and reduces
the storage overhead. C-MEM protocol overcomes the crowded-center problem by
forwarding the location claim to a random point called cross point. The claim is
again forwarded along the horizontal and vertical lines from the cross point. Nodes
on these lines act as watcher, and those closer to the cross point are witness node.
CC-MEM uses the concept of both cross-forwarding and cell-forwarding used in C-
MEM and BC-MEM respectively. The detection probability is higher in CC-MEM.
Above memory efficient schemes are able to achieve lower storage overhead using
Bloom filter. However, their communication overhead increases significantly with
improvement in detection probability in C-MEM and CC-MEM.
Distributed detection with group deployment knowledge
Group deployment knowledge is used in the schemes proposed by Ho et al. [41].
They have proposed three schemes. In their first scheme, a node is preloaded with
its pre-determined group deployment point. The nodes within the same group are
expected to be deployed closer to each other. Nodes closer to their group deploy-
ment point are considered to be trusted, whereas the nodes that are far away from
the group deployment point are considered to be untrusted. A node ignores the
message received from the untrusted nodes. Nodes belonging to different groups
can communicate with each other, only if the distance between their group deploy-
ment point is less than a threshold value. In their second scheme, they have relaxed
the criteria to communicate with untrusted neighbor. In this scheme, a node can
communicate with an untrusted node, only if the untrusted node provides sufficient
evidence in terms of location claim that it is not a replica. In their third scheme, a
node forwards the location claim of an untrusted neighbor to multiple groups instead
of the untrusted neighbor’s home group. Since, the above schemes use deployment
knowledge, their memory requirements are significantly lower. Verification of un-
trusted nodes may require large number of message exchanges. This will increase
the communication overhead of the network. Moreover, the above schemes may not
be suitable for the applications, where it is difficult to determine or compute the
group deployment point well in advance.
Randomly Directed Exploration
Li et al. [42] proposed a claim broadcast based technique called randomly directed
exploration. In this scheme, nodes generate a number of claim messages and each
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message containing a Time-to-leave (TTL) value is forwarded to a randomly selected
neighbor. An intermediate node computes its angle with the witness location. To
forward the location claim, an intermediate node selects a node that is closer to the
computed angle plus pi. When two or more conflicting location claims of a node is
received by a witness node, it is detected as a replica. This scheme is similar to RM,
but differs from RM in the claim forwarding mechanism. In RDE, a TTL field is
used to prevent indefinite routing. This scheme suffers from higher communication
overhead.
Distributive, Deterministic and Resilient Scheme (DDR)
Kim et al. [24] proposed a distributive, deterministic, and resilient (DDR) scheme.
In this scheme, nodes are associated with a verification point in the network. Ver-
ification point is generated by the BS prior to the node deployment. The verifi-
cation point is the destination for the location-claim of a node. A node generates
the location-claim, estimates the expected hop-count to the verification point, and
then sends the location claim to the verification point through a randomly chosen
neighboring node. An intermediate node on receiving the location claim decreases
the hop-count by one, and caches the location claim based on some probability,
before forwarding it to the verification point. A node that receives two different
location-claims for the same ID detects it as a replica. DDR is similar to LSM.
Both schemes cache the location-before claim forwarding to next node. Common
intermediate nodes for a large number of forwarding paths are overloaded with the
task of storing and forwarding location claim.
Early and Lightweight Distributed Detection Protocol
Tran et al. [43] proposed two light-weight protocols which they called: i) LANCE,
and ii) SACRED. In LANCE protocol, a network-wide counter is maintained which
is incremented by one, after a pre-defined time interval. A clone will have the
counter value different from others. When a clone broadcasts its counter value, it is
considered as a replayed counter value and is detected as a replica. The SACRED
protocol is a secured version of LANCE. In this protocol, nodes take the help of
location claim and authentication mechanism similar to LSM [36]. LANCE assumes
that nodes are time-synchronized. It is difficult to ensure time-synchronization in
a sensor network. Moreover, a powerful adversary can forge the original counter
value.
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Table 2.2: Categorization of different replica detection schemes.
Scheme
Detection Geographical Claim Routing
Mechanism Information forwarding type
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RM & LSM [36] - -
√ √
- -
√ √
-
SET [25]
√
- - -
√ √
- -
√
Bekara et al. [38] -
√
- - -
√
- -
√
Xing et al. [27] -
√
- -
√ √
- -
√
Sei et al. [39] - -
√ √
-
√
- -
√
NBDS [29] -
√
- -
√
-
√
-
√
B-MEM, BC-MEM - -
√ √
-
√
-
√
-
C-MEM, CC-MEM [40]
Ho et al. [41] - -
√ √
- -
√ √
-
RDE [42] - -
√ √
-
√
-
√
-
DDR [24] - -
√ √
-
√
- -
√
LANCE [43] - -
√
-
√
- - - -
SACRED [43] - -
√ √
- -
√ √
-
SDC, P-MPC [22] -
√
-
√
- -
√ √
-
RAWL, TRAWL [44] - -
√ √
- -
√ √
-
Meng et al. [31] -
√
- -
√
-
√
-
√
RED [32] -
√
-
√
- -
√ √
-
Naruephiphat et al. [26]
√
- -
√
-
√
- -
√
Znaidi et al. [23] -
√
- -
√ √
- - -
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Random-Walk Based Scheme
Two non-deterministic and fully distributed protocols called: i) Random-Walk
Based Detection (RAWL), and ii) Table Assisted Random-Walk Based Detection
(TRAWL) are proposed by Zeng et al. [44]. In RAWL, the location-claim of a
node is forwarded by its neighbor to a selected number of nodes with probability p.
These nodes initiate the random-walk process in the network. A node that passes
the random-walk process acts as a witness node, and stores the location-claim. A
location conflict is detected as a replica by the witness nodes. TRAWL is a variation
of RAWL, where a node that passes the random-walk, stores the location-claim with
a probability equal to c√
N logN
, where c is a constant. The location-claim is stored
as a digest in the trace table of witness nodes. Since the location-claim is sent to a
set of witness nodes, the communication and storage overhead is expensive.
Table 2.2 shows the categorization of node replica detection schemes. It is
observed from the table that most of the fully distributed detection schemes are
location-dependent. They use node’s location-claim for replica detection. Therefore,
geographical routing mechanisms are more suitable to minimize routing path-length
for these schemes. Location-independent schemes mostly use link-based routing
protocols for communication.
The content of claim message and the authentication technique used in each of
the above schemes is shown in Table 2.3. It is observed from the table that the size
of the claim message in Znaidi et al. [23] scheme is significantly smaller than rest of
the schemes. This is because the Znaidi et al.’s scheme uses encrypted Bloom filter.
The message overhead is higher for those schemes that contains list of node IDs in
the message such as in SET [25], NBDS [29], RDE [42], and Meng et al. [31]. In
subsequent sections, we have compared and analyzed a few detection schemes that
are widely referred by the researchers of this field.
2.3 Analysis
In this section, we made a quantitative comparison of different replica detection
schemes. The metrics used for comparison are communication and storage overhead
associated in detecting a replica. Communication and storage overhead of different
schemes are analyzed in sub-section 2.3.1. Number of nodes required for detecting
a replica also affects replica detection ability of a scheme. In sub-section 2.3.2, we
have analyzed the number of nodes required for replica detection.
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Table 2.3: Authentication technique used and the content of claim message in different scheme.
Scheme Content of the claim message Authentication Technique
RM, LSM [36] ( ID, Location, Signature ) Merkle-Winternitz signature [45]
SET [25] ( ID, Sets of Node IDs, MAC ) HMAC [46]
Bekara et al. [38] ( Generation ID, MAC ) Symmetric Bivariate Polynomial [47]
Xing et al. [27] ( ID, Node’s Fingerprint, data ) -
Sei et al. [39] ( ID, Location, Signature )
Identity-Based Signature
Scheme (IBSS) [48,49]
NBDS [29] ( ID, Neighbor ID List, Signature) EIBSSBP [50]
B-MEM, BC-MEM
( ID, Location, Signature ) IBSS
C-MEM, CC-MEM [40]
Ho et al. [41] ( ID, Location, MAC ) TinyECC [51]
RDE [42]
( TTL, ID, Location,
IBSS
Neighbor ID List, Signature )
DDR [24]
( ID, Location, hop-count,
Symmetric Key [52]
verification point, MAC )
SACRED [43] ( ID, Location, Signature ) Symmetric Key
SDC, P-MPC [22] ( ID, Location, Signature ) EIBSSBP [50]
RAWL, TRAWL [44] ( ID, Location, Signature ) TinyECC
Meng et al. [31] ( ID, Neighbor ID sub-list, time, Signature ) EIBSSBP [50]
RED [32] ( ID, Location, Signature ) IBSS
Naruephiphat et al. [26] ( ID, Location, Signature ) -
Znaidi et al. [23] ( Encrypted Bloom Filter, Signature ) Elliptive-Curve Cryptography (ECC) [53]
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2.3.1 Communication and Storage Overhead
Communication cost is the number of messages exchanged in the network for replica
detection. Storage overhead is the additional information stored per node in replica
detection. The analysis of communication and storage overhead of different schemes
is given below.
RM and LSM [36]
In RM [36], each node broadcasts all received location-claims. Therefore, commu-
nication overhead is O(N2). However, LSM forwards the location-claim in a line
to the witness nodes. In a network of size N , the average path length is given by
O(
√
N) [36]. Therefore, communication overhead of LSM is O(N.
√
N).
Parno et al. [36] using birthday paradox, have shown that replica may be de-
tected with a higher probability if at least
√
N number of nodes will store the
location-claim of a node. Therefore, storage overhead of a node in both RM and
LSM scheme is O(
√
N).
SET [25]
In SET [25], each node participates in the subset leader election process by sending
a broadcast message. In addition to leader election, each subset leader has an ad-
ditional task of forwarding membership list to the BS. The average communication
overhead of each node is O(1) and therefore, communication cost of SET is O(N).
In SET, there is no storage overhead because none of the nodes including the subset
leaders need to store the membership information.
Symmetric pair-wise key establishment scheme [38]
In this scheme, each node establishes pair-wise key with its neighbors on deployment.
Therefore, overall communication overhead is O(N). There is no storage overhead
associated with this scheme because the replica detection depends only on the pair-
wise key establishment made by a node with its neighbors.
Real-time Detection Scheme [27]
In this scheme, each node needs to share its codeword with the neighboring node
for the computation of fingerprint. This sharing requires communication overhead
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of O(N) in the network. Each node needs to store the codeword of the neighboring
nodes. Therefore, storage overhead of this scheme O(d).
Distributed Detection Scheme Resilient to Many Compromised Nodes
[39]
In this scheme, the reporter node forwards the claim to a number of witness nodes
similar to LSM scheme. Therefore, communication overhead of this scheme is
O(N.
√
N). Each node becomes witness of g number of nodes and store their claim.
Therefore, storage overhead is O(g).
NBDS [29]
In NBDS, the neighboring nodes of a newly joined node forwards the existence
verification message to old neighbor’s of the node with a probability p. Therefore,
communication overhead of this scheme is O(d.p.
√
N). On receiving the rejoining
claim only the old neighbors store in their cache. Therefore, storage overhead of
the scheme is O(d.p).
Memory Efficient Protocols [40]
All variations of this scheme forward the location-claim of a node to a random wit-
ness location. Therefore, communication overhead is same as the overhead of LSM
and Sei et al., i.e, O(N.
√
N). The watcher and anchor nodes store the location-
claim using Bloom filter. Therefore, no storage overhead is associated with this
scheme.
Distributed detection with group deployment knowledge [41]
In Ho et al. [41], the location-claim of a node is forwarded to its detector with a
probability p. Therefore, communication overhead of the scheme is O(N.d.p.
√
N).
Storage overhead of this scheme is O(w), where w is the number of witness nodes
holding the location-claim of a node.
RDE [42]
In this scheme, selected neighbors forward the location-claim in a random direction.
Therefore, communication overhead of O(N.
√
N). Since, the number of witness
nodes for a claim is d, the storage overhead is O(d).
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DDR [24]
This scheme is similar to LSM. Therefore, communication and storage overhead of
this scheme is O(N.
√
N) and O(
√
N) respectively.
LANCE & SACRED [43]
LANCE protocol includes the counter value in Hello messages. Therefore, it does
not require additional communication to share the counter value of a node among
its neighbors. SACRED mechanism is similar to LSM. Therefore, communication
overhead of SACRED is O(N.
√
N). The counter variable in LANCE does not incur
any additional storage overhead; whereas SACRED has storage overhead of O(
√
N).
SDC & P-MPC [22]
Communication overhead of SDC and P-MPC is the sum of overheads in sending
a location-claim to the destination cell and forwarding the claim to all the nodes
within the destination cell. The communication cost of sending location-claim to
destination cell(s) depends on the number of neighboring nodes and the probability
p. Therefore, communication cost of sending a location-claim to a destination cell is
O(N.d.p.
√
N). Similarly, the communication cost for sending a claim to g number
of destination witness cells is O(N.g.d.p.
√
N). If the number of nodes within a cell
is given by s, then communication overhead for sending the claim to all nodes within
a cell is given by O(s). Therefore, the overall communication overhead of SDC and
P-MPC is O(N.d.p.
√
N) +O(s) and O(N.g.d.p.
√
N) +O(s) respectively.
Let ps be the probability of storing a location-claim by a node within the des-
tination cell(s). The additional storage overhead of both the schemes to store the
location-claim is O(w), where w is the number of witness nodes, which is equal to
s.ps and s.g.ps for SDC and P-MPC respectively.
RAWL & TRAWL [44]
In [44], communication overhead of a node is evaluated in terms of number of
random-walks performed per each claim. It is given that
√
N. logN number of
random-walks are performed for each location-claim and is sufficient to detect a
replica. Therefore, communication and storage overhead of both the schemes are
O(N.
√
N. logN) and O(
√
N. logN) respectively.
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A Note-Based Randomized and Distributive Protocol [31]
In this scheme, a reporter node forwards the subset claim of a node to g number of
witness nodes. Therefore, communication overhead of this scheme is O(N.g.
√
N).
The storage overhead is O(g).
RED [32]
In RED, each neighboring node generates a random number of witness locations
for a location-claim and forwards with a probability p. For g number of witnesses,
communication overhead of RED is O(N.g.d.p.
√
N). Nodes that are closer to wit-
ness locations receive and store the location-claim of a node. Therefore, storage
overhead of RED is O(g.d.p).
An Area-Based Approach [26]
In this approach, location-claim of a node is sent to the witness node of the respective
area and then to the central node following a path with an average path length of√
N . Therefore, communication overhead of this scheme is O(N.
√
N). The highest
storage overhead is associated with the central and witness nodes. The number of
claims held by a central and witness node is given by N and N
a
respectively, where a
denotes the number of areas defined in the network. Therefore, the storage overhead
of this scheme is given by O(N).
Hierarchical Node Replication Detection Scheme [23]
The major communication overhead of this scheme is in exchanging the member IDs
among the cluster-heads. In a network of t number of clusters, the communication
overhead is O(t2). The cluster-heads keep the member IDs of its own and other
clusters with the help of Bloom filter. Therefore, the storage overhead of this
scheme is O(t).
2.3.2 Comparison of Number of Nodes Responsible for Replica
Detection.
The probability of replica detection also depends on the number of nodes responsible
for detecting a replica. We call this as Number of Replica Detectors Per Node. The
measure of detection probability and the detection time mostly depends on this
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Table 2.4: A quantitative comparison of different schemes based on communication,
storage overhead, and number of nodes responsible for replica detection per node.
Scheme
Communication Storage Number of Replica
Overhead Overhead Detectors Per Node
RM [36] O(N2) O(
√
N)
√
N
LSM [36] O(N.
√
N) O(
√
N)
√
N
SET [25] O(N) -
√
t
Bekara et al. [38] O(N) - d
Xing et al. [27] O(N) O(d) d
Sei et al. [39] O(N.
√
N) O(g) g
NBDS [29] O(d.p.
√
N) O(d.p) d
B-MEM [40] O(N.
√
N) -
√
N
BC-MEM [40] O(N.
√
N) -
√
s
C-MEM [40] O(N.
√
N) - 2.
√
N
CC-MEM [40] O(N.
√
N) - 2.
√
s
Ho et al. [41] O(N.d.p.
√
N) O(w) w
RDE [42] O(N.
√
N) O(d) d
DDR [24] O(N.
√
N) O(
√
N) vp
LANCE [43] - - d
SACRED [43] O(N.
√
N) O(
√
N)
√
N
SDC [22] O(N.d.p.
√
N) +O(s) O(w) s
P-MPC [22] O(N.g.d.p.
√
N) +O(s) O(w) g.s
RAWL [44] O(N.
√
N. logN) O(
√
N. logN) g
TRAWL [44] O(N.
√
N. logN) O(
√
N. logN) g
Meng et al. [31] O(N.g.
√
N) O(g) g
RED [32] O(N.g.d.p.
√
N) O(g.d.p) g.d
Naruephiphat et al. [26] O(N.
√
N) O(N) w
Znaidi et al. [23] O(t2) O(t) t
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parameter. That is, a higher Number of Replica Detectors Per Node will have a
higher detection probability and lower detection time.
In the detection schemes such as RM and LSM [36], Sei et al. [39], [40], Ho et
al. [41], DDR [24], SACRED [43], SDC and P-MPC [22], RAWL and TRAWL [44],
RED [32], and Naruephiphat et al. [26], Number of Replica Detectors Per Node is
equal to number of witnesses per node. In SET [25], all subset leaders in the path
from the node to the BS are responsible for replica detection. For t number of subset
leaders, Number of Replica Detectors Per Node is given by
√
t. In the schemes such
as Bekara et al. [38], Xing et al. [27], NBDS [29], RDE [42], and LANCE [43],
the neighboring nodes are responsible for detecting replica. Therefore, Number
of Replica Detectors Per Node for these schemes is equal to d. In hierarchical
detection schemes such as Znaidi et al. [23], the cluster-heads are responsible for
replica detection. Therefore, the Number of Replica Detectors Per Node for these
schemes is equal to t. It can be observed from the Table that the Number of Replica
Detectors Per Node is comparatively higher in location-based schemes.
Communication and storage overhead associated with each scheme, and the
Number of Replica Detectors Per Node are summarized in Table 2.4.
Table 2.5: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Area 1000 x 1000 m2
Network size 1000 – 10000
Deployment type Uniformly random
Communication range 55 meter
Average number of neighbors 30
Number of clones deployed 10
Simulation Time 600 sec
Number of witness 10
Claim forwarding probability 0.5
2.4 Simulation
We have simulated a few replica detection schemes to analyze their effectiveness.
Schemes considered for simulation are LSM [36], SET [25], Sei et al. [39], SDC [22],
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and RED [32]. The above schemes are often referred by researchers in replica
detection. Castalia-3.2 [54] is used for simulation that runs on the top of Omnet++
[55]. Parameters considered for simulation are summarized in Table 2.5. Metrics
considered for comparison are: i) Detection probability, ii) Average number of
packets sent/received per node, iii) Energy consumed per node, iv) First clone
detection time. The above metrics are considered because it is desirable to have
a replica detection scheme with higher detection probability, lower detection time,
lesser number of packets sent/receive per node and consume less energy. A large
number of packets sent/receive in the detection process will not only utilize higher
bandwidth but also depletes the energy at the node. Higher energy consumption in
the detection process will decrease the longevity of the node.
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Figure 2.4: Detection probability vs. Network size.
The plot for Detection probability vs. Network size is shown in Figure 2.4. From
the figure it is observed that RED has the highest detection probability among
the schemes selected for comparison. This is because of the higher Number of
Replica Detectors Per Node. From Table 2.4, it can be observed that RED have
comparatively higher Number of Replica Detectors Per Node than LSM, SET, Sei et
al., and SDC. Moreover, RED was proposed to improve the performance of location-
based schemes.
Figure 2.5 shows Detection probability vs. The number of witnesses for a net-
work of 1000 nodes. It is observed that the detection probability increases with
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Figure 2.5: Detection probability vs. Number of witnesses for N = 1000.
increase in the number of witnesses for each scheme. Increase in the number of
witnesses increases the probability that the conflicting location-claims would reach
to at least one witness in the network. Therefore, this leads to improvement in
detection probability.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
N
um
be
r o
f p
ac
ke
ts 
se
nt
/re
ce
iv
ed
 p
er
 n
od
e
Network size
SET
LSM
RED
SDC
Sei et al.
Figure 2.6: Average number of packets sent/received vs. Network size.
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Average number of packets sent/received per node vs. Network size is shown
in Figure 2.6. It is observed from the figure that the number of packets exchanged
per node is higher in RED [32] and lower in SET [25]. This is because, RED have
higher communication overhead and SET have lower communication overhead than
other schemes. This is shown in Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.7: Energy consumed vs. Network size.
The energy consumed per node vs. Network size is shown in Figure 2.7. The
energy consumption of a sensor node is the sum of the energy consumed by processor
function, transceiver function, and sensor function. It is observed from the figure
that the energy consumption in SET is marginally lower than SDC, LSM, and
RED. This is because of lower communication overhead and longer message size
in SET. A marginal higher energy consumption in Sei et al. [39] is attributed to
the full broadcast mechanism it uses to forward the claim; which consumes more
energy even for a smaller path than the scheme that adapts probabilistic forwarding
mechanism.
The plot for Clone detection time vs. Network size is shown in Figure 2.8.
Clone detection time is the time difference between the first clone deployed in the
network and the first clone detected. From the figure, it is observed that LSM
takes lesser time to detect the deployed clone in comparison to other schemes. This
is because, in LSM each intermediate node between the location claimer and its
witness nodes caches the location-claim. These intermediate nodes, in addition to
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Figure 2.8: First clone detection time vs. Network size.
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Figure 2.9: First clone detection time vs. Number of witnesses for N = 1000.
the witness nodes also detect a replica when a location conflict occurs; whereas in
other schemes, replica is detected either by witness nodes or BS. It is also observed
that SET have higher clone detection time. This is because, in SET, replica is
mostly detected either by the BS or the nodes closer to BS. This requires more
detection time compared to other schemes.
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Finally, the detection time of LSM, RED, SDC, and Sei et al. is plotted varying
the number of witnesses to 10, 20, and 30 for a network of 1000 nodes. This is
shown in Figure 2.9. It is observed that detection time reduces with increase in
the number of witnesses. This is because, a higher number of witnesses reduce the
number of hops between a claimer and its witness nodes.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have briefly discussed the various schemes for replica detection
as reported in the literature. We have classified the existing schemes based on the
detection mechanism, need of geographical information, claim forwarding strategy,
and message routing type. A quantitative analysis of different schemes is presented.
We have simulated a few popular replica detection schemes such as SET [25], LSM
[36], SDC [22], Sei et al. [39], and RED [32] to compare their effectiveness. The
metrics considered for comparison are detection probability, detection time, average
number of packets sent/received, and energy consumption. We observed that the
RED has higher detection probability, and relatively higher detection time. The
SET incurs lower communication overhead than other schemes. We need a scheme
that not only have higher detection probability but also lower detection time. Since,
energy is an important issue in WSN, a replica detection scheme should also consume
lesser energy as well. In a nutshell it is desirable to have a replica detection scheme
that has higher detection probability, lower detection time, communication overhead
and energy consumption.
Most of the replica detection mechanisms require the exchange of membership
information among the nodes. Therefore, a lightweight mechanism for exchang-
ing information among the nodes is required in replica detection. Next chapter,
describes a mechanism for exchanging group information among the nodes.

Chapter 3
Mechanism for Exchanging
Group Membership Information
Applications such as cluster formation, clone detection, and neighbor-list sharing
require the exchange of group membership information among the nodes. Group
membership information consists of the identity of all nodes in the group. Trivial
method of exchanging the group membership information is to send the individual
identity of all nodes in the group. Though, this method of information exchange
is simpler, yet it leads to higher message overhead even for a group of smaller size.
Another method for exchanging group membership information is to use bit-stream.
The number of bits in the bit-stream is equal to the size of the network. The ith bit
in the bit-stream is set to One, if the node with identity, i, is a member of the group.
In this scheme, the size of the bit-stream increases proportionately with the size of
the network. For larger networks, the overhead associated with communication and
storage is higher. Another mechanism proposed in the literature is to use Bloom
filter [33, 34, 56]. This is an efficient technique for exchanging group membership
information. However, it suffers from higher cases of false positive i.e., a node may
be reported as a member of a group when it is not.
For exchanging group membership information the overhead associated with
a scheme should not only be lower, but also should not give rise to any case of
false positive. In this chapter, we propose two schemes, namely, Transpose Bit-
Pair Coding (TBC), and Sub-Mat Coding (SMC) to reduce the communication and
storage overhead associated with exchanging group membership information among
the nodes. The proposed schemes not only reduce the communication and storage
overhead, but also do not generate any false positive.
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3.1 Related Work
One of the simplest method for exchanging group membership information is to
exchange the identity of each member of the group. This form of exchange was
adopted by Choi et al. [25], Meng et al. [31], and Naruephiphat et al. [26] in their
proposed schemes. The number of identities exchanged per message depend on
the size of the message. With the increase in the network size, the number of
nodes per group also increases. As a result, the number of messages exchanged to
share the group membership information increases. Therefore, this method is not
suitable for a dense network. To reduce the communication overhead, a subset of
group membership identities is exchanged instead of the identities of entire group
membership [31]. This scheme can reduce communication overhead to some extent,
but cannot provide the complete group membership information of a node.
Znaidi et al. [23], Zhang et al. [40], and Deng et al. [57] have used Bloom filter
[33, 34, 56] in their proposed schemes to share the group membership information.
A Bloom filter consists of the following: i) One b-bit array B, to store and test the
membership of a node, and ii) k number of hash functions, Hi(), 0 ≤ i ≤ k to map
the identity of a group member to certain number of bits in B.
To add a member IDx to the Bloom filter, all Hi(IDx) positions are set to one
in the bit-array B. The membership of a node IDy is tested by checking for a value
one in every position, Hi(IDy) of B. Group membership sharing mechanisms that
are based on Bloom filter have lower memory and communication cost. However,
they suffer from higher probability of false positive. Given k, the probability of false
positive p is given by
p =
(
1−
(
1− 1
b
)k.n)k
≈
(
1− e− k.nb
)k
(3.1)
where, b is the length of the array B and n is the number of members in a group
[33, 34]. For a given value of k and b, the probability of false positive p, increases
with the increase in the size n and decreases as b increases. The optimal number of
hash functions as computed in [34] is given by
k =
(
b
n
)
ln 2 (3.2)
For a given false positive probability p, the length of the Bloom filter b, is pro-
portional to the number of elements being filtered n [34], which is expressed as
follows:
b = − n ln p
(ln 2)2
(3.3)
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For an optimal value of k, Bloom filter with one percent of error requires 9.6 bits
per element. Size of the array B, determines the communication and storage cost
associated with Bloom filter. Each additional 4.8 bits per element, decreases the
error rate by one-tenth. Further details on Bloom filter can be found in [33,34,56].
Another method for exchanging group membership information is the use of
bit-stream [58, 59]. In this scheme, the number of bits in a bit-stream is equal to
the size of the network. The ith bit in the bit-stream is set to one, if the node with
identity, i, is a member of the group. This method works well in a network of fixed
size. However, the size of the bit-stream increases proportionately with the size of
the network. In a dense network with relatively smaller group size, the overhead
associated with communication and storage is higher.
Data compression techniques for WSNs are proposed in [60–62]. These tech-
niques operate on sensed data and make extensive use of RAM. Therefore, they are
not suitable for exchanging group membership in WSN.
The bit-stream based mechanisms do not generate false positives. However,
they have higher storage and communication cost. Mechanisms based on Bloom
filter have higher cases of false positives. The communication and storage cost
associated with such mechanisms are lower. Therefore, we need a scheme that does
not generate false positive, and the associated communication and storage cost is
comparable with that of Bloom filter. In TBC and SMC, we have tried to balance
between the cases of false positives and associated cost.
3.2 Proposed Mechanism
In this section, we propose two schemes: i) Transpose Bit-Pair Coding (TBC),
and ii) Sub-Mat Coding (SMC) for exchanging group members’ identity among the
nodes. In the proposed scheme, group membership information is encoded into a bit-
stream, which is exchanged among the nodes. The encoded bit-stream is stored at
a node and is decoded to obtain the group membership information. The encoding
technique is lossless and does not generate false positives.
The format used in representing the group membership information is described
in sub-section 3.2.1. TBC and SMC are described in sub-section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3
respectively.
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3.2.1 Representation of Group Membership Information
This sub-section describes the representation of group membership information that
is used in the proposed schemes. Let N be the network size and nG be the average
size of a group where, nG < N , and let SG be an arbitrary group. Members of the
group, SG, are represented in the form of a matrix, M, as shown below:
M =


m0,0 m0,1 . . . m0,Dim−1
m1,0 m1,1 . . . m1,Dim−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
mDim−1,0 mDim−1,1 . . . mDim−1,Dim−1

 (3.4)
where, the element mi,j stores one-bit of information about the membership of a
node whose identity is (Dim ∗ i + j). Given the N,nG and SG, the matrix M is
constructed as follows:
mi,j =
{
1 iff node with an identity, (Dim ∗ i+ j) ∈ SG
0 otherwise
(3.5)
We have assumed the network size, N ≤ Dim×Dim, and the identity of nodes are
unique integral value in [0, N − 1].
3.2.2 Transpose Bit-Pair Coding (TBC)
TBC takes the group membership matrix M, as input and produces a bit-stream C,
where |C| << N . The bit-stream is generated by considering each pair of elements
mi,j and mj,i of M. An element is considered only once in the generation of a
bit-stream. Let c be the partial bit-stream generated from a pair of elements mi,j
and mj,i. Then, c is generated using the following equation:
c =


mi,j i = j
0 i 6= j,mi,j = mj,i = 0
10 i 6= j,mi,j = 1,mj,i = 0
110 i 6= j,mi,j = 0,mj,i = 1
111 i 6= j,mi,j = 1,mj,i = 1
(3.6)
The encoding process in TBC is given in Algorithm 3.1, where only the upper
triangular matrix of M is traversed. The bit-stream C, can also be generated by
traversing only the lower triangular matrix of M. In Step 3 of Algorithm 3.1 each
element of the main diagonal is read, and written into the bit-stream. From Step 6
to 17 a pair of elements at index (i, j) and (j, i) of M is read and the corresponding
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Algorithm 3.1: Transpose Bit-Pair Coding
Input: Matrix, M
Output: Bit-stream, C
1 k ←− 0
2 for i← 0 to Dim− 1 do
3 C(k)←− mi,i
4 k ←− k + 1
5 for j ← i+ 1 to Dim− 1 do
6 if mi,j = 0 & mj,i = 0 then
7 C(k)←− 0
8 k ←− k + 1
9 else if mi,j = 1 & mj,i = 0 then
10 C(k)←− 1, C(k + 1)←− 0
11 k ←− k + 2
12 else if mi,j = 0 & mj,i = 1 then
13 C(k)←− 1, C(k + 1)←− 1, C(k + 2)←− 0
14 k ←− k + 3
15 else
16 C(k)←− 1, C(k + 1)←− 1, C(k + 2)←− 1
17 k ←− k + 3
Algorithm 3.2: Transpose Bit-Pair Decoding
Input: Bit-stream, C
Output: Matrix, M ′
1 k ←− 0
2 for i← 0 to Dim− 1 do
3 m′i,i ←− C(k)
4 k ←− k + 1
5 for j ← i+ 1 to Dim− 1 do
6 if C(k) = 0 then
7 m′i,j ←− m
′
j,i ←− 0
8 else
9 k ←− k + 1
10 if C(k) = 0 then
11 m′i,j ←− 1, m
′
j,i ←− 0
12 else
13 k ←− k + 1
14 if C(k) = 0 then
15 m′i,j ←− 0, m
′
j,i ←− 1
16 else
17 m′i,j ←− 1, m
′
j,i ←− 1
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bit-stream is generated as per the transition diagram shown in Figure 3.1(a). The
time complexity in generating the bit-stream is O(Dim2) = O(N) as N ≈ Dim2.
C(k) = 0
k = k + 1
C(k) = 1
C(k+1) = 0
k = k + 2
C(k) = 1
C(k+1) = 1
C(k+2) = 0
k = k + 3
m
i,j =1, m
j,i =
 1
m
i,j =0, mj,i = 1
C(k) = 1
C(k+1) = 1
C(k+2) = 1
k = k + 3
m i,j
=0, 
m j,i
= 
0
m i,j=1, m j,i
= 0
mi,j & m j,i
Read
(a)
mi,j= 1
mj,i= 1
k = k + 1
C(k)
Read
C(k)
Read
mi,j= 0
mj,i= 1
k = k + 1
C(k)
Read
C(k) = 0
C(k) = 1
C(k) = 0
C(k) = 1
C(k) = 0
C(k) = 1
mi,j= 0
mj,i= 0
k = k + 1
mi,j= 1
mj,i= 0
k = k + 1
k = k + 1
k = k + 1
(b)
Figure 3.1: Transition diagrams showing: (a) Encoding in TBC, (b) Decoding in
TBC.
The decoding process in TBC is given in Algorithm 3.2. Step 3 of the algorithm
generates the element across the main diagonal. Step 5 to 17 generates a pair of
elements mi,j and mj,i of matrix M as per the transition diagram shown in Figure
3.1(b). The time complexity of the decoding process in TBC is O(N). We claim
the following from the encoding and decoding process in TBC.
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Claim 3.1. The encoding and decoding process in TBC is unique.
Proof. The encoding and decoding process in TBC is said to be unique, if the
following two conditions hold true:
i) The mapping f :M → C is one-to-one, and
ii) The decoding of bit-stream C is unambiguous
The mapping function f :M→ C is uniquely defined by the Equation 3.6. The state
transition diagram shown in Figure 3.1(a), reads a pair of element and uniquely
generates the corresponding bit-stream. Therefore, the mapping function f is one-
to-one.
The decoding process follows the prefix codes, i.e, no code is a prefix of any
other code. Transition diagram in Figure 3.1(b) shows the decoding process. From
the transition diagram it is observed that the decoding process is unambiguous.
We illustrate below the encoding and decoding process in TBC with a suitable
example. Let us consider a network with the following parameters: N = 100,
nG = 12, and SG = { 6, 11, 19, 25, 28, 35, 38, 46, 59, 64, 87, 91}. The matrix M
representing SG is given below:
M =


0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


Table 3.1 shows the encoding process of matrix,M, to generate the bit-stream C,
for the given SG. The bit-stream generated by TBC for SG in the above example is
{0000001000010000000111000100010000100010000111000000010000001100000}. The
generated bit-stream gives the membership information of a group, which is shared
among the nodes.
The decoding algorithm generates a matrix, M ′, from which the membership
information of the group is obtained. The elements of M ′ for the bit-stream, C,
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Table 3.1: Encoding of matrix M, in TBC.
Indices Bits Code Code Bits Code Indices Bits Code
(i,j)(j,i) mi,jmj,i c (i,j)(j,i) mi,jmj,i c (i,j)(j,i) mi,jmj,i c
(0, 0)(0, 0) 00 0 (0, 1)(1, 0) 00 0 (0, 2)(2, 0) 00 0
(0, 3)(3, 0) 00 0 (0, 4)(4, 0) 00 0 (0, 5)(5, 0) 00 0
(0, 6)(6, 0) 10 10 (0, 7)(7, 0) 00 0 (0, 8)(8, 0) 00 0
(0, 9)(9, 0) 00 0 (1, 1)(1, 1) 11 1 (1, 2)(2, 1) 00 0
(1, 3)(3, 1) 00 0 (1, 4)(4, 1) 00 0 (1, 5)(5, 1) 00 0
(1, 6)(6, 1) 00 0 (1, 7)(7, 1) 00 0 (1, 8)(8, 1) 00 0
(1, 9)(9, 1) 11 111 (2, 2)(2, 2) 00 0 (2, 3)(3, 2) 00 0
(2, 4)(4, 2) 00 0 (2, 5)(5, 2) 10 10 (2, 6)(6, 2) 00 0
(2, 7)(7, 2) 00 0 (2, 8)(8, 2) 10 10 (2, 9)(9, 2) 00 0
(3, 3)(3, 3) 00 0 (3, 4)(4, 3) 00 0 (3, 5)(5, 3) 10 10
(3, 6)(6, 3) 00 0 (3, 7)(7, 3) 00 0 (3, 8)(8, 3) 10 10
(3, 9)(9, 3) 00 0 (4, 4)(4, 4) 00 0 (4, 5)(5, 4) 00 0
(4, 6)(6, 4) 11 111 (4, 7)(7, 4) 00 0 (4, 8)(8, 4) 00 0
(4, 9)(9, 4) 00 0 (5, 5)(5, 5) 00 0 (5, 6)(6, 5) 00 0
(5, 7)(7, 5) 00 0 (5, 8)(8, 5) 00 0 (5, 9)(9, 5) 10 10
(6, 6)(6, 6) 00 0 (6, 7)(7, 6) 00 0 (6, 8)(8, 6) 00 0
(6, 9)(9, 6) 00 0 (7, 7)(7, 7) 00 0 (7, 8)(8, 7) 01 110
(7, 9)(9, 7) 00 0 (8, 8)(8, 8) 00 0 (8, 9)(9, 8) 00 0
(9, 9)(9, 9) 00 0
considered in the above example is shown in Table 3.2. From M ′, we obtain the
membership information of the group as { 6, 11, 19, 25, 28, 35, 38, 46, 59, 64, 87,
91}, which is same as the one considered in the example.
3.2.3 Sub-Mat Coding (SMC)
In SMC scheme, the membership matrix, M, is logically divided into 2 x 2 sub-
matrices as shown below. Each sub-matrix of M is then used to generate a portion
of the bit-stream C.
M =


[
m0,0 m0,1
m1,0 m1,1
]
. . .
[
m0,Dim−2 m0,Dim−1
m1,Dim−2 m1,Dim−1
]
. . . . . . . . .[
mDim−2,0 mDim−2,1
mDim−1,0 mDim−1,1
]
. . .
[
mDim−2,Dim−2 mDim−2,Dim−1
mDim−1,Dim−2 mDim−1,Dim−1
]


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=


M0,0 M0,2 . . . M0,Dim
2
−1
M2,0 M2,2 . . . M2,Dim
2
−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
MDim−2,0 MDim−2,2 . . . MDim
2
−1,Dim
2
−1

 (3.7)
where,
Mi,j =
[
m2∗i,2∗j m2∗i,2∗j+1
m2∗i+1,2∗j m2∗i+1,2∗j+1
]
(3.8)
. Let c be the partial bit-stream generated from a sub-matrix M i,j . Then, c is
generated as shown below:
c =


0 if Mi,j =
[
0 0
0 0
]
1‖m2∗i,2∗j‖m2∗i,2∗j+1‖m2∗i+1,2∗j‖m2∗i+1,2∗j+1 otherwise
(3.9)
where, ‖ is used as concatenation operator.
Algorithm 3.3: Sub-MAT Coding
Input: Matrix, M
Output: Bit-stream, C
1 k ←− 0
2 for i← 0 to Dim− 1 with increment 2 do
3 for j ← 0 to Dim− 1 with increment 2 do
4 if mi,j = mi,j+1 = mi+1,j = mi+1,j+1 = 0 then
5 C(k)←− 0
6 k ←− k + 1
7 else
8 C(k)←− 1
9 C(k + 1)←− mi,j
10 C(k + 2)←− mi,j+1
11 C(k + 3)←− mi+1,j
12 C(k + 4)←− mi+1,j+1
13 k ←− k + 5
Algorithm 3.3 shows the encoding process in SMC. In Step 2 to 13 of the al-
gorithm each element of the sub-matrix M i,j , is read and its corresponding bit-
stream is generated using Equation 3.9. Figure 3.2(a) shows the generation of
bit-stream from each sub-matrix M i,j . The time complexity of this algorithm is
O(Dim2) = O(N).
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Table 3.2: Decoding of bit-stream C, in TBC.
Index Input m′i,j & m
′
j,i Index Input m
′
i,j & m
′
j,i
(i, j) Bit (i, j) Bit
0, 0 0 m′0,0 = 0 0, 1 0 m
′
0,1 = m
′
1,0 = 0
0, 2 0 m′0,2 = m
′
2,0 = 0 0, 3 0 m
′
0,3 = m
′
3,0 = 0
0, 4 0 m′0,4 = m
′
4,0 = 0 0, 5 0 m
′
0,5 = m
′
5,0 = 0
0, 6 1 Read next bit 0, 6 0 m′0,6 = 1,m
′
6,0 = 0
0, 7 0 m′0,7 = m
′
7,0 = 0 0, 8 0 m
′
0,8 = m
′
8,0 = 0
0, 9 0 m′0,9 = m
′
9,0 = 0 1, 1 1 m
′
1,1 = 1
1, 2 0 m′1,2 = m
′
2,1 = 0 1, 3 0 m
′
1,3 = m
′
3,1 = 0
1, 4 0 m′1,4 = m
′
4,1 = 0 1, 5 0 m
′
1,5 = m
′
5,1 = 0
1, 6 0 m′1,6 = m
′
6,1 = 0 1, 7 0 m
′
1,7 = m
′
7,1 = 0
1, 8 0 m′1,8 = m
′
8,1 = 0 1, 9 1 Read next bit
1, 9 1 Read next bit 1, 9 1 m′1,9 = 1,m
′
9,1 = 1
2, 2 0 m′2,2 = 0 2, 3 0 m
′
2,3 = m
′
3,2 = 0
2, 4 0 m′2,4 = m
′
4,2 = 0 2, 5 1 Read next bit
2, 5 0 m′2,5 = 1,m
′
5,2 = 0 2, 6 0 m
′
2,6 = m
′
6,2 = 0
2, 7 0 m′2,7 = m
′
7,2 = 0 2, 8 1 Read next bit
2, 8 0 m′2,8 = 1,m
′
8,2 = 0 2, 9 0 m
′
2,9 = m
′
9,2 = 0
3, 3 0 m′3,3 = 0 3, 4 0 m
′
3,4 = m
′
4,3 = 0
3, 5 1 Read next bit 3, 5 0 m′3,5 = 1,m
′
5,3 = 0
3, 6 0 m′3,6 = 1,m
′
6,3 = 0 3, 7 0 m
′
3,7 = 1,m
′
7,3 = 0
3, 8 1 Read next bit 3, 8 0 m′3,8 = 1,m
′
8,3 = 0
3, 9 0 m′3,9 = 1,m
′
9,3 = 0 4, 4 0 m
′
4,4 = 0
4, 5 0 m′4,5 = m
′
5,4 = 0 4, 6 1 Read next bit
4, 6 1 Read next bit 4, 6 1 m′4,6 = m
′
6,4 = 1
4, 7 0 m′4,7 = m
′
7,4 = 0 4, 5 0 m
′
4,8 = m
′
8,4 = 0
4, 5 0 m′4,9 = m
′
9,4 = 0 5, 5 0 m
′
5,5 = 0
5, 6 0 m′5,6 = m
′
6,5 = 0 5, 7 0 m
′
5,7 = m
′
7,5 = 0
5, 8 0 m′5,8 = m
′
8,5 = 0 5, 9 1 Read next bit
5, 9 0 m′5,9 = 1,m
′
9,5 = 0 6, 6 0 m
′
6,6 = 0
6, 7 0 m′6,7 = m
′
7,6 = 0 6, 8 0 m
′
6,8 = m
′
8,6 = 0
6, 9 0 m′6,9 = m
′
9,6 = 0 7, 7 0 m
′
7,7 = 0
7, 8 1 Read next bit 7, 8 1 Read next bit
7, 8 0 m′7,8 = 0,m
′
8,7 = 1 7, 9 0 m
′
7,9 = m
′
9,7 = 0
8, 8 0 m′8,8 = 0 8, 9 0 m
′
8,9 = m
′
9,8 = 0
9, 9 0 m′9,9 = 0
Decoding process in SMC is shown in Algorithm 3.4. Step 2 to 13 of the al-
gorithm construct each sub-matrix. Transition diagram in Figure 3.2(b) shows the
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Algorithm 3.4: Sub-MAT Decoding
Input: Bit-stream, C
Output: Matrix, M ′
1 k ←− 0
2 for i← 0 to Dim with increment 2 do
3 for j ← 0 to Dim with increment 2 do
4 if C(k) = 0 then
5 m′i,j ← m
′
i,j+1 ← m
′
i+1,j ← m
′
i+1,j+1 ← 0
6 k ←− k + 1
7 else
8 m′i,j ←− C(k + 1)
9 m′i,j+1 ←− C(k + 2)
10 m′i+1,j ←− C(k + 3)
11 m′i,j ←− C(k + 4)
12 k ←− k + 5
construction of sub-matrices. The time complexity of the decoding process is O(N).
We claim the following from the encoding and decoding process in SMC.
Claim 3.2. The process of encoding and decoding in SMC is unique.
Proof. The encoding and decoding process in SMC is said to be unique, if the
following two conditions hold true:
i) The mapping f :M→ C is one-to-one, and
ii) The decoding of bit-stream C is unambiguous
In SMC, the mapping function f :M → C generates a bit-stream corresponding to
the sub-matrix M i,j , as given in Equation 3.9. Figure 3.2(a) shows that the gen-
eration of bit-stream is one-to-one. The decoding of the bit-stream is unambiguous
as shown in the Figure 3.2(b).
We explain below the encoding and decoding process in SMC using the example
in sub-section 3.2.2. Each sub-matrix of M is given below:
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m i,j m i,j+1 m i+1,j m i+1,j+1= = = = 0
mi+1,j , and m i+1,j+1
i,j , m i,j+1m
Read
C(k) = 1
C(k+1) = m i,j
C(k+2) = m i,j+1
C(k+3) = m i+1,j
C(k+4) = m i+1,j+1
k = k + 5
C(k) = 0
k = k + 1
Otherwise
(a)
Read
C(k)
mi,j= 0
mi,j+1= 0
mi+1,j= 0
mi+1,j+1 = 0
k = k + 1
i,j= C(k+1)
mi,j+1= C(k+2)
mi+1,j= C(k+3)
mi+1,j+1 = C(k+4)
k = k + 5
m
C(k) = 0
C(k) = 1
(b)
Figure 3.2: Transition diagrams showing: (a) Encoding in SMC, (b) Decoding in
SMC.
M =


[
0 0
0 1
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
1 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 1
]
[
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 1
0 1
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
1 0
1 0
]
[
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
1 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 1
]
[
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
1 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
]
[
0 0
0 1
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
] [
0 1
0 0
] [
0 0
0 0
]


The code generated from each of sub-matrix M i,j of M represented in the form of
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Table 3.3: Decoding of bit-stream C, in SMC.
Index Input Action Matrix
(i, j) Bit
0, 0 1 Read next 4 bits m′0,0 = 0,m
′
0,1 = 0,m
′
1,0 = 0,m
′
1,1 = 1
0, 2 0 - m′0,2 = m
′
0,3 = m
′
1,2 = m
′
1,3 = 0
0, 4 0 - m′0,4 = m
′
0,5 = m
′
1,4 = m
′
1,5 = 0
0, 6 1 Read next 4 bits m′0,6 = 1,m
′
0,7 = 0,m
′
1,6 = 0,m
′
1,7 = 0
0, 8 1 Read next 4 bits m′0,8 = 0,m
′
0,9 = 0,m
′
1,8 = 0,m
′
1,9 = 1
2, 0 0 - m′2,0 = m
′
2,1 = m
′
3,0 = m
′
3,1 = 0
2, 2 0 - m′2,2 = m
′
2,3 = m
′
3,2 = m
′
3,3 = 0
2, 4 1 Read next 4 bits m′2,4 = 0,m
′
2,5 = 1,m
′
3,4 = 0,m
′
3,5 = 1
2, 6 0 - m′2,6 = m
′
2,7 = m
′
3,6 = m
′
3,7 = 0
2, 8 1 Read next 4 bits m′2,8 = 1,m
′
2,9 = 0,m
′
3,8 = 1,m
′
3,9 = 0
4, 0 0 - m′4,0 = m
′
4,1 = m
′
5,0 = m
′
5,1 = 0
4, 2 0 - m′4,2 = m
′
4,3 = m
′
5,2 = m
′
5,3 = 0
4, 4 0 - m′4,4 = m
′
4,5 = m
′
5,4 = m
′
5,5 = 0
4, 6 1 Read next 4 bits m′4,6 = 1,m
′
4,7 = 0,m
′
5,6 = 1,m
′
5,7 = 0
4, 8 1 Read next 4 bits m′4,8 = 0,m
′
4,9 = 0,m
′
5,8 = 1,m
′
5,9 = 1
6, 0 0 - m′6,0 = m
′
6,1 = m
′
7,0 = m
′
7,1 = 0
6, 2 0 - m′6,2 = m
′
6,3 = m
′
7,2 = m
′
7,3 = 0
6, 4 1 Read next 4 bits m′6,4 = 1,m
′
6,5 = 0,m
′
7,4 = 1,m
′
7,5 = 0
6, 6 0 - m′6,6 = m
′
6,7 = m
′
7,6 = m
′
7,7 = 0
6, 8 0 - m′6,8 = m
′
6,9 = m
′
7,8 = m
′
7,9 = 0
8, 0 1 Read next 4 bits m′8,0 = 0,m
′
8,1 = 0,m
′
9,0 = 1,m
′
9,1 = 1
8, 2 0 - m′8,2 = m
′
8,3 = m
′
9,2 = m
′
9,3 = 0
8, 4 0 - m′8,4 = m
′
8,5 = m
′
9,4 = m
′
9,5 = 0
8, 6 1 Read next 4 bits m′8,6 = 0,m
′
8,7 = 1,m
′
9,6 = 0,m
′
9,7 = 0
8, 8 0 - m′8,8 = m
′
8,9 = m
′
9,8 = m
′
9,9 = 0
a matrix, M c, is shown below:
M c =


10001 0 0 11000 10001
0 0 10101 0 11010
0 0 0 11000 10001
0 0 11000 0 0
10001 0 0 10100 0


The matrix, M c, is read row-wise to generate the bit-stream C. The bit-stream
C generated by SMC for the group SG considered in the example is
{10001001100010001001010101101000011000100010011000001000100101000}.
Decoding of the bit-stream C in SMC is shown in Table 3.3.
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3.3 Simulation and Results
In this section, the performance of TBC and SMC is analyzed through simulation.
Parameters considered for simulation are shown in Table 3.4. We have compared
TBC and SMC with the following schemes: i) that exchange the identity of each
node [25,26,31] (call this as Scheme1), and ii) that uses bit-stream of size N [58,59]
(call this as Scheme2), and iii) that uses Bloom filter. We have assumed that nodes
are identified by a unique integer and is represented by sixteen bits.
Table 3.4: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Network size (N) 1024 – 10000
Group size 2.5 – 15 (in % of N)
Number of groups 10 – 40
Maximum number of neighbors 150
Matrix Dimension (Dim) 32 – 100
Table 3.5 shows the space required in terms of number of bits by each scheme
to store the group membership information. Size of the group is considered to be
150. Scheme1 and scheme that uses Bloom filter depend only on the group size.
Therefore, the number of bits required in these two schemes is constant for network
of different size. Scheme2 solely depends on the network size. The number of bits
required in Scheme2 increases with the network size. Both TBC and SMC depend
on the group size and network size. Therefore, the number of bits required increases
marginally with network size.
Next, the size of the group is varied from 2.5% to 15% of N . Tables 3.6, 3.7,
and 3.8 show the number of bits required when the network size N , is 1024, 4900,
and 10000 respectively. It is observed from the Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 that SMC
requires a lesser number of bits in comparison with other schemes for a given group
size. This is because, in SMC and TBC the bit-stream is generated from a sparse
matrix representing the group membership information. More the sparseness in the
matrix, lesser the number of bits generated.
Then, the comparison of the schemes is made with a metric called space saving
percentage. We define the space saving percentage of a scheme with respect to a
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Table 3.5: Number of bits required to store group membership information in
Scheme1, Scheme2, Bloom filter, TBC and SMC.
N Scheme1 Scheme2 TBC SMC Bloom Filter Bloom Filter
with 1% error with 0.1% error
1024 2400 1024 778 737 1440 2160
2500 2400 2500 1550 1175 1440 2160
3600 2400 3600 2124 1426 1440 2160
4900 2400 4900 2793 1813 1440 2160
6400 2400 6400 3520 2176 1440 2160
8100 2400 8100 4374 2592 1440 2160
10000 2400 10000 5400 3100 1440 2160
Table 3.6: Number of bits required to store group membership information in
Scheme1, Scheme2, Bloom filter, TBC, and SMC for N = 1024.
Group Size
Scheme1 Scheme2 TBC SMC
Bloom Filter Bloom Filter
(% of N) with 1% error with 0.1% error
2.5 410 1024 573 359 246 369
5 819 1024 615 461 492 738
7.5 1229 1024 646 533 738 1106
10 1639 1024 686 604 983 1475
15 2458 1024 758 737 1475 2212
Table 3.7: Number of bits required to store group membership information in
Scheme1, Scheme2, Bloom filter, TBC, and SMC for N = 4900.
Group Size
Scheme1 Scheme2 TBC SMC
Bloom Filter Bloom Filter
(% of N) with 1% error with 0.1% error
2.5 1968 4900 2646 1715 1176 1764
5 3920 4900 2842 2156 2352 3528
7.5 5888 4900 3038 2500 3528 5292
10 7840 4900 3185 2891 4704 7056
15 11760 4900 3577 3528 7056 10584
base scheme as follows:
Number of bits required in the base scheme - Number of bits required by the new scheme
Number of bits required in base scheme
∗100
(3.10)
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Table 3.8: Number of bits required to store group membership information in
Scheme1, Scheme2, Bloom filter, TBC, and SMC for N = 10000.
Group Size
Scheme1 Scheme2 TBC SMC
Bloom Filter Bloom Filter
(% of N) with 1% error with 0.1% error
2.5 4000 10000 5400 3400 2400 3600
5 8000 10000 5800 4400 4800 7200
7.5 12000 10000 6100 5200 7200 10800
10 16000 10000 6500 5900 9600 14400
15 24000 10000 7200 7300 14400 21600
The plot for space saving percentage vs. group size of TBC and SMC with respect
to Bloom filter is shown in Figure 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) respectively. It is observed
from the figures that the space saving percentage is higher in TBC and SMC for
larger group size. This is because, the number of bits required to represent group
membership information in Bloom filter is directly proportional to the group size.
We have also compared the proposed schemes with Bloom filter for false positive
cases. The false positive probability of Bloom filter is computed using Equation
3.1. The false positive probability of TBC and SMC is computed as the sum of
the ratio of number of nodes that are falsely detected as a member of the group in
each iteration to the total number of nodes in the group divided by the number of
iterations. The plot for the false detection probability of Bloom filter vs. group size
is given in Figure 3.4(a). The value of b is taken to be 750 bits and the number of
hash functions k, is set to 5, 10, and 15. It is observed from the figure that the false
detection probability increases with the increase in number of hash functions for a
fixed value of b. The Figure 3.4(b) shows the plot for false detection probability
of Bloom filter vs. group size, where the value of b is varied to 250, 500, and 750
bits. The value of k is taken to be 5. It is observed from the figure that the false
detection probability of Bloom filter decreases with the increase in the size of b.
Figure 3.5 shows the comparison of SMC with Bloom filter for false positive
cases. False detection probability of Bloom filter is plotted varying the value of b to
737, 1175, and 1813 for network size of 1024, 2500, and 4900 respectively. The value
of k is considered to be 5. The false detection probability of Bloom filter increases
with the increase in group size for a given network size, whereas, SMC do not give
rise to false positive cases.
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Figure 3.3: Space saving percentage vs. Network size in TBC and SMC.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, various mechanisms for exchanging group membership information
among the nodes in WSN are discussed. The strengths and weaknesses in existing
mechanisms are identified. Mechanism for exchanging group membership informa-
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Figure 3.4: False positive probability of Bloom filter vs. Group size.
tion should have lower communication and storage overhead. The aforementioned
properties are satisfied by the mechanisms that are based on Bloom filter. However,
Bloom filter suffers from false positives. In this chapter, we proposed two mech-
anisms called TBC and SMC. Both TBC and SMC generates a bit-stream from
the membership matrix. The encoding and decoding process in each scheme is de-
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Figure 3.5: False positive probability vs. Group size in Bloom filter and SMC.
scribed. We have also shown that the encoding and decoding process in TBC and
SMC is unique. TBC and SMC are compared with two trivial schemes and one that
uses Bloom filter. The parameters considered for comparison are number of bits
required to store group membership information, space saving percentage, and false
positive probability. It is found that TBC and SMC do not generate false positive
and the space saving percentage is significantly higher compared to Bloom filter.
This is because, TBC and SMC are deterministic, whereas Bloom filter determine
the membership of a node with some probability. SMC achieves better space saving
percentage than TBC; mostly when the group size is relatively small. However, the
disadvantage of the proposed scheme is, the space saving percentage is lower, when
the group size is large. In this case, the size of the code bit-stream is close to N .
The proposed scheme has an additional storage overhead to store the membership
bit matrix, but it is less than the storage overhead of other mechanisms that use
standard representation to store member IDs.
Next Chapter describes a zone-based replica detection mechanism for WSN. In
this scheme, membership information is exchanged among zones to detect replica.

Chapter 4
Zone-Based Node Replica
Detection
Most of the node replica detection schemes reported in the literature are location-
dependent and probabilistic in nature. It is difficult to guarantee clone-free sensor
networks using probabilistic approach. Moreover, location-dependent schemes incur
additional memory overhead in storing location-claims.
In this chapter, we have proposed a node replica detection scheme called zone-
based node replication detection (ZBNRD). The proposed scheme logically divides
the network into number of zones. Each zone has a zone-leader, who is responsible
for detecting replica in the network. Replica detection is done at two-levels: i)
intra-zone, and ii) inter-zone. ZBNRD is deterministic and location independent.
No memory overhead is associated for storing location information.
4.1 Assumptions
In this section, we describe the assumptions made in the proposed zone-based node
replication detection scheme. Table 4.1 shows the notations used in the proposed
scheme.
4.1.1 Network Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about sensor networks: i) Nodes are connected,
static, non-tamper resistant, and are uniformly deployed in the area of observation,
ii) Communication links are bidirectional, iii) There is no centralized trusted entity,
iv) Nodes are not aware of their position, i.e, there is no built-in mechanism to know
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Table 4.1: List of notations and symbols.
Symbols Meaning
N Size of the network
NZ Number of zones in the network
d Average degree of a node
Z ID of the zone
nZ Average size of zone Z
IDLZ ID of the zone-leader of zone Z
IDi ID of the node i
SIGSK(X) Digital signature of X signed with secret key SK
|| Concatenation operation
H Cryptographic hash function
the node’s physical location, and v) Nodes are assigned with a unique ID, prior to
their deployment.
4.1.2 Adversary Model
The following assumptions are made about the adversary: i) It has the ability to
capture any number of sensor nodes, ii) Once a node is compromised, the adversary
gains full control over the node, iii) An adversary can create as many replicas of
the captured node as she wishes and deploy in the network, and iv) An adversary
cannot create a new ID for replica.
4.2 Proposed Scheme
We describe the proposed zone-based node replica detection scheme (ZBNRD) be-
low. In ZBNRD, the network is divided into number of zones similar to SET [25].
However, all members of a zone in ZBNRD may not be within the one-hop neigh-
bor of the zone-leader. Zones are formed dynamically. Identity-based public key
crypto-system is used for authenticating messages [48,49]. Each zone in ZBNRD has
a zone-leader; whose responsibility is to detect replicas. Zone-leaders are selected
apriori before deployment. Each node in the network belongs to exactly one zone. A
zone-leader maintains the list of all members in its zone, and the list of zone-leaders
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present in the network. ZBNRD operates in two phases: i) Zone Registration, and
ii) Replica Detection. We illustrate below the actions performed in each phase.
4.2.1 Zone Registration
Zone registration phase is initiated as soon as sensor nodes are deployed in the target
area. In this phase, nodes register themselves with a zone-leader. Zone registration
begins with the broadcast of a zone registration message ZONE REGD by the
zone-leaders. The format of ZONE REGD message is < Z, IDLZ , SIGSKIDLZ
(H((Z||IDLZ)) >, where Z and IDLZ are the IDs of a zone and its zone-leader
respectively. ZONE REGD message is an invitation to nodes by a zone-leader to
become a member of its zone. Figure 4.1, and 4.2 shows the zone registration
process, where the dotted lines indicate the broadcast of ZONE REGD message,
and the solid lines indicate the connectivity. In the above figures, node A, B,
C, D and E are the zone-leaders. Figure 4.1 shows the broadcast of ZONE REGD
message to one-hop neighbors, and Figure 4.2 shows the broadcast of ZONE REGD
message by one-hop neighbors of zone-leaders. A node may receive a ZONE REGD
Figure 4.1: ZONE REGD message broadcast to one-hop neighbors.
message from more than one zone-leaders. However, the node will register to only a
single zone whose zone-leader is closer to it. A node becomes the member of a zone
by sending a zone join message ZONE JOIN to the corresponding zone-leader. The
format of ZONE JOIN message is < IDm, IDLZ , SIGSKm (H(IDm||IDLZ)) >,
where IDm is the ID of joining node. A node on receiving the first ZONE REGD
message broadcast it to all its neighbors, and discards the subsequent ZONE REGD
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Figure 4.2: ZONE REGD message broadcast to two-hop neighbors.
messages from the same zone. However, a node broadcast a ZONE REGD message
with a probability, pregd, if the message is from a zone which is different from the
zones it has already received. When a ZONE JOIN message arrives at a zone-leader,
it verifies the existence and authenticity of the requested node before adding it to its
membership list. ZONE JOIN reply message from one-hop and two-hop neighbors
of zone-leaders is shown in Figure 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. When a zone-leader
receives a ZONE REGD message from another zone-leader, it updates the routing
path to it. A case of zone formation at the end of zone registration phase is shown
in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.3: ZONE JOIN reply message from one-hop neighbors.
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Figure 4.4: ZONE JOIN reply message from two-hop neighbors.
Figure 4.5: A case of zone formation.
At the end of zone registration phase, zone-leaders share their membership list
with each other as shown in Figure 4.6. To reduce the message and communication
overhead between zone-leaders, we use the SMC scheme as described in Chapter 3.
A zone-leader on receiving membership list from other zones, verify for the existence
of a replica. The existence of a node’s ID in two different zones lead to a conflict. A
zone-leader on detecting a conflict initiates a revocation message NODE REVOKE,
which is broadcasted to all its members and zone-leaders. This process will detect
replicas that are deployed during the registration phase.
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Figure 4.6: Zone membership list sharing path of zone-leaders.
4.2.2 Replica Detection
This section deals with replica detection. An adversary may deploy a replica in the
same zone to which the original node belongs or in a different zone. Depending
on the location of deployed replica, there are two possible cases of detection: i)
Intra-zone detection: Node and its replica are members of the same zone, and ii)
Inter-zone detection: Node and its replica are members of different zones. Both the
detection process is explained below.
Figure 4.7: Intra-zone replica detection.
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Figure 4.8: Inter-zone replica detection.
i) Intra-zone detection: When a zone-leader receives a ZONE JOIN message, it
checks for the existence of the node in its membership list, and broadcast a
revocation message if the node is already a member of its zone. Otherwise,
inter-zone detection is initiated. Figure 4.7 shows a scenario for intra-zone de-
tection. Zone-leader A, on receiving ZONE JOIN message from replica node
10, checks its membership list. Since, node 10 is already present in its mem-
bership list, zone-leader detects node 10 to be a replica. Then, it broadcast a
ZONE REVOKE message for node 10. Finally, node 10 is removed from the
network.
ii) Inter-zone detection: This is initiated, when a node that has sent ZONE
JOIN message is not present in the current membership list of the zone-
leader. Zone-leader sends a NEW JOIN message to other zone-leaders and
starts a timer. The message format of NEW JOIN message is < Z, IDnew,
SIGSKIDLZ
(H(Z||IDnew)) >, where IDnew is the ID of the node that has
newly joined after registration phase. Zone-leaders on receiving NEW JOIN
message verify the existence of the node with ID, IDnew, in their membership
list. If a conflict is detected, then the zone-leader sends a ZONE REVOKE
message for the new node, IDnew, to all zone-leaders and to its own zone
members. When the zone-leader that initiated the NEW JOIN message re-
ceives a revocation message, it broadcasts to its members. The node IDnew
is then revoked from the network. A zone-leader accepts the new node as
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its member only when it does not receive a revocation message from any of
the other zone-leaders before the timer expires. Figure 4.8 shows the case for
inter-zone detection.
In case a zone-leader fails, then the nodes of the failed zone re-join to one of their
nearest zone.
4.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of ZBNRD.
4.3.1 Connectivity
We have assumed that the sensor network is connected. Therefore, a node in the
network will receive a zone registration message from at least one zone-leader. We
claim the following:
Claim 4.1. A node in the network belongs to exactly one zone.
Proof. We prove our claim by means of contradiction. Let us assume that there
exists at least one node say, k, that does not belong to exactly one zone. In this
scenario, there will be two cases: (i) the node k belongs to more than one zone, or
(ii) k is not a member of any zone.
Case 1: In our proposed scheme, a node may receive ZONE REGD message
from more than one zone, but responds to only one. Node k, is a member of more
than one zone implies that node k has responded to more than one ZONE REGD
message. This violates our proposed protocol that a node replies to only one ZONE
REGD message. Hence, this contradicts our assumption.
Case 2: Node k, is not a member of any zone; this implies that the node k, has
not received a ZONE REGD message from any zone-leaders. This is possible if k
is not reachable from any zone-leader. But we have assumed that the network is
connected. Therefore, node k, is reachable from every other node in the network.
Further, by setting the value of pregd >
1
nZ
, we can ensure that each node broadcast
at least two zone registration message to its neighbors. If the node k, has not
received at least one ZONE REGD message from zone-leaders, this implies that
node k, is not reachable which a contradiction to our assumption that the network
is connected. Therefore, k is a member of only one zone.
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4.3.2 Security Analysis
We evaluate, the security of ZBNRD based on the following parameters.
i) Replica detection: Assume that node i belongs to a zone Z, and an adversary
has deployed a replica ic, in a zone Z
′
. When the replica ic, send a ZONE
JOIN message to the zone-leader of Z
′
, it verifies the existence of the replica ic,
by sending a NEW JOIN message to the zone-leader of Z. The zone-leader of
Z on detecting a replica sends a ZONE REVOKE message to all zone-leaders
and its members. Thus, a replica is detected and revoked from the network
in ZBNRD.
ii) Secured communication between zone-leaders: Zone-leaders encrypt and dig-
itally sign every message shared among themselves with their private key.
Thus, an adversary must have the private key to read and modify the mes-
sage. Obtaining the private key is a difficult job as keys are assigned at the
time of deployment. Therefore, the communication between the zone-leaders
are secured.
Table 4.2: Communication and Storage Overhead Comparison.
Schemes Communication Memory
Location
Dependent
Centralized Detection O(N.
√
N) O(d) yes
Node-to-Network Broadcasting O(N2) O(d) yes
Deterministic Multicast O(N.w. lnw
√
N
d
) O(w) yes
Randomized Multicast [36] O(N2) O(
√
N) yes
Line-Selected Multicast [36] O(N.
√
N) O(
√
N) yes
RED [32] O(d.p.
√
N) O(d.p) yes
SDC [22] O(d.p.
√
N) +O(s) O(w) yes
P-MPC [22] O(d.p.
√
N) +O(s) O(d.p) yes
SET [25] O(N) N/A no
NBDS [41] O(d.p.
√
N) O(d.p) no
Znaidi et al. [23] O(t2) O(t) no
ZBNRD O(N.
√
nZ) +O(Nz.
√
N) O(d)/O(nZ) no
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4.3.3 Communication Overhead
There are two types of communication cost associated with ZBNRD: i) During
registration phase, and ii) During replica detection.
i) Communication cost during registration phase: The communication cost as-
sociated during the registration phase is equal to the sum of the costs asso-
ciated with ZONE REGD message, and ZONE JOIN reply message. Each
node broadcasts the first ZONE REGD message with a probability of one
and the subsequent messages from different zones with a probability of pregd.
The average path length in a network of N nodes is given by O(
√
N) [36].
Therefore, average communication cost to broadcast ZONE REGD message is
O(d.pregd.nZ .
√
nZ). The average communication cost associated with ZONE
JOIN reply message is O(N.
√
nZ). Hence, the average communication cost
during registration phase is O(d.pregd.nZ .
√
nZ) +O(N.
√
nZ) = O(N.
√
nZ).
ii) Communication cost for replica detection: For intra-zone detection, neighbors
communicate with their zone-leaders. Therefore, the average communication
cost for intra-zone detection is O(d.
√
nZ). For inter-zone detection, a zone-
leader communicates with other zone-leaders. Therefore, the average com-
munication cost for inter-zone detection is given by O(Nz.
√
N), where Nz is
the number of zones in the network. Total communication cost in detecting a
replica is max{O(d.√nZ), O(Nz.
√
N)}, which is equal to O(Nz.
√
N).
The overall communication cost of ZBNRD is O(N.
√
nZ) + O(Nz.
√
N). Average
size of a zone is given by N
Nz
, where Nz << N . Therefore, the overall communication
cost of ZBNRD is O(N
√
N).
4.3.4 Storage Overhead
In ZBNRD, a zone-leader maintains the list of all its members and additional in-
formation regarding other zone-leaders. The memory overhead associated with a
zone-leader is O(Nz + nZ). We have assumed that Nz ≤ nZ . Therefore, the mem-
ory overhead of a zone-leader is O(nZ). A node in the network maintains only the
information about its neighbors and zone-leader. Therefore, memory overhead for
each node is given by O(d).
Table 4.2 shows the comparison of average communication and storage cost of
ZBNRD with other existing schemes. Here w is the number of witness nodes, and
t is the number of cluster heads defined for network.
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Table 4.3: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Area 1000 x 1000 m2
Network size 1000-10000
Deployment type Uniformly random
Topology type Random topology
Communication range 55 meter
Maximum network packet size 20 bytes
Average number of neighbors 40
Number of runs 100
Simulation Time 200 sec
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Figure 4.9: Total packets sent/received for detecting replica in the network vs.
network size in ZBNRD.
4.4 Simulation Results
We performed simulation using Castalia 2-3b [54] that runs on Omnet++ [55].
Parameters considered for simulation are shown in Table 4.3. Replicas are randomly
deployed. Simulation was performed varying the network size from 1000 to 10000
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Figure 4.10: Average number of packets sent/received per node for detecting replica
vs. network size in ZBNRD.
and number of zones in the network to 10, 20 and 30.
The plot for total packets sent/received in detecting a replica is shown in Figure
4.9. It is observed from the figure that the average number of packets sent/received
in the network increases with the increase in network size. This is an expected
result. It is also observed from the figure that the number of packets sent/received
in the network increases with the increase in the number of zones. This is because,
with increase in the number of zones, number of zone-leaders also increases. As a
result, the number of ZONE REGD message increases giving rise to the increase in
number of packets sent/received in the network.
In Figure 4.10, we plot the average number of packets sent/received per node
vs. network size. From the figure, it is observed that the number of packets
sent/received per node in detecting replica remains almost constant irrespective
of the network size. It is also observed from the figure that, for the same net-
work size, the average number of packets sent/received per node increases with the
increase in the number of zones in the network. This is because, the number of
messages exchanged per node for zone formation is independent of network size.
Therefore, the average number of packets sent/received per node remains almost
constant with variation in the network size for a fixed number of zones. However,
when the number of zones increases, the number of messages required for zone for-
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mation also increases. Therefore, the average number of packets sent/received per
node increases with the number of zones.
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Figure 4.11: Total packets sent/received during zone formation vs. network size.
In Figure 4.11, we made a comparison between theoretical value and the simu-
lated one, for the number of packets sent/received during zone formation. Values
obtained in the simulation are much lower in comparison to theoretical communi-
cation cost.
The plot for maximum path length vs. network size varying the number of zones
in the network is shown in Figure 4.12. As the number of zone increases there is a
marginal decrease in the path length for a network of equal size, as well as with the
increase in network size. This is attributed to the increase in the number of zones
in the network.
Figure 4.13 shows the plot for time to detect first replica vs. network size varying
the number of zones. It is observed from the figure that there is a marginal increase
in the time to detect the first replica as the network size increases. This is because,
in the proposed scheme, the replica detection takes place after zone formation. With
increase in the network size, the time for zone formation also increases. As a result,
the time to detect replica also increases.
Next, we compared the ZBNRD with a few existing location-dependent and
location-independent schemes. The comparison of ZBNRD with location-dependent
and location-independent schemes are discussed in sub-section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 re-
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Figure 4.15: Comparison of ZBNRD with location-dependent schemes for average
number of packets sent/received per node vs. network size.
4.4.1 Comparison of ZBNRD with location-dependent schemes
In this section, we have compared ZBNRD with location-dependent schemes such
as LSM [36], P-MPC [22], and RED [32]. Comparison for detection probability
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Figure 4.16: Comparison of ZBNRD with location-independent schemes for detec-
tion probability vs. network size.
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Figure 4.17: Comparison of ZBNRD with location-independent schemes for average
number of packets sent/received per node vs. network size.
vs. network size is shown in Figure 4.14 and for the average number of packets
sent/received vs. network size is shown in Figure 4.15. From Figure 4.14, it is
observed that ZBNRD has a higher detection probability in comparison to LSM, P-
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MPC, and RED. This is because ZBNRD is deterministic, whereas LSM, P-MPC,
and RED are probabilistic in nature. There is a marginal decrease in detection
probability at higher network size. This is attributed to communication congestion
in dense networks. From Figure 4.15, it is observed that ZBNRD has a lower number
of packets sent/received per node than other location dependent schemes. This is
because, in ZBNRD, each node joins in exactly one zone. The number of ZONE
JOIN message sent by a node is only one. In other schemes the location claim of a
node is send to a number of witness nodes in the network.
4.4.2 Comparison of ZBNRD with location-independent schemes
In this sub-section, we compared ZBNRD with location-independent schemes such
as SET [25], Ho et al. [41] and Znaidi et al. [23]. The plot for detection probability vs.
network size is shown in Figure 4.16. It is observed from the figure that the detection
probability of ZBNRD is almost identical with other location independent schemes.
However, there is a marginal drop in detection probability at higher network size.
This is due to congestion at higher node density. Figure 4.17 shows the plot for the
average number of packets sent/received per node vs. network size. It is observed
from the figure that ZBNRD has lower number of packets sent/received per node in
comparison with [41] and [23], and higher in comparison with SET. This is because,
the communication complexity in ZBNRD is lower, compared with [41] and [23],
and higher than SET. This is shown in Table 4.2.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a zone-based node replica detection scheme (ZBNRD)
for WSN. In ZBNRD, network is divided into number of zones. Each zone has
a zone-leader, who is responsible for detecting replicas in the network. ZBNRD
operates in two phases: i) Zone Registration, and ii) Replica Detection. In the zone
registration phase, nodes join to one of the zone. A node becomes a member of
exactly one zone. At the end of zone registration phase, zone-leaders exchange their
membership list. At this stage, replicas deployed during the registration phase are
detected. We have compared ZBNRD with a few existing schemes. It is observed
that ZBNRD have higher detection probability than other schemes. This is due to
the deterministic nature of the ZBNRD, whereas other schemes are probabilistic in
nature. For zones of equal size and uniformly distributed zone-leaders, ZBNRD has
lower communication overhead. However, for large number of zones, as well as dense
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networks, the communication overhead increases. It is also observed that for smaller
number of zones, the average path length is higher. This increases end-to-end delay
between nodes.
In the next chapter, a replica detection scheme based on node coloring technique
is proposed.
Chapter 5
Node Coloring Based Replica
Detection
In this chapter, we propose a distributed, location-independent replica detection
scheme called Node Coloring Based Replica Detection (NCBRD). In this scheme,
each node is assigned with a color (value), which is unique within its neighborhood.
Color conflict within the neighborhood is detected as replica. Since, NCBRD is
location-independent, it does not incur the additional overhead of sending, receiving,
and verifying the location-claims. In addition to improving the detection probability,
NCBRD also attempts to minimize the communication overhead.
5.1 Assumptions
This section describes the assumptions made about the network and adversaries.
5.1.1 Network Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about the network: i) Nodes are static and
uniformly deployed, ii) Connectivity is symmetric, iii) No centralized trusted in-
frastructure, iv) Nodes are assigned with a predefined color set prior to their deploy-
ment, v) Identity-based crypto-system is used for secured communication between
neighboring nodes, and vi) Nodes are equipped with omni-directional antenna.
5.1.2 Assumptions about an Adversary
The following assumptions are made about an adversary: i) An adversary has the
ability to compromise a subset of nodes, ii) She can modify the color assigned to the
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captured node, iii) Adversary can create as many replica of the captured node as
she wishes, and v) Adversary does not deploy the replica within the neighborhood
of a captured node as this will not lead to any significant benefit for the adversary.
Table 5.1: List of Notations used in NCBRD.
Notation Meaning
N Size of the network
CLR Set of available colors to a node
NBDi Set consisting of IDs’ of neighboring nodes of node i
Colori Color of a node with ID i
Initiatori Initiator of node i
d Average number of neighbors of a node
SIGk(X) Signature of X with key, k
SKi Secret key of node i
5.2 Node Coloring Based Replica Detection
In this section, we describe the proposed Node Coloring Based Replica Detection
(NCBRD) technique. Notations used in NCBRD are summarized in Table 5.1. In
NCBRD, a color (value) is assigned to each node. Color assignment process ensures
that the color assigned to a node is unique within it’s neighborhood. A color conflict
within the neighborhood of a node is detected as a replica. Color conflict occurs,
when either of the following conditions are satisfied: i) Two or more neighbors of
a node including the node itself claim the same color, and ii) The color as claimed
by the neighbor of a node exists in the color set of the node, i.e., the node has not
assigned the claimed color to any of its neighbor.
Node coloring process is described in sub-section 5.2.1, and replica detection in
sub-section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Node Coloring
In this sub-section, we explain the process of color assignment to a node. Color
assignment process is distributive and concurrent in nature. Each node uses color
from a finite set of colors, CLR, where |CLR| defines the upper bound on the
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number of trusted neighbors a node can have in the network. Node coloring process
is initiated by an Initiator, which is defined as follows: Initiator is a node, which
assigns color to its neighboring nodes during the coloring process. It is not a special
node. Any node in the network can act as an Initiator, provided it has an assigned
color. We use the term Initiator to distinguish between the color assigner and
assignee during the coloring process. We call, the assigner as the Initiator. Prior to
the deployment, a set of nodes are randomly chosen to act as Initiator. These nodes
start the color assignment process within the network. A node, which obtains color
during the color assignment process, acts as the Initiator. Only the Initiator assigns
color to its neighboring nodes in the proposed scheme. Once an Initiator assigns a
color, it removes that color from its color set CLR. The color assigning process of
an Initiator is completed when all its neighbors are colored. The coloring process
in the network is completed when the color assigning process of all nodes in the
network is over. Nodes are colored only once in their lifetime. A node is assigned
with a color during the coloring process. A node that is assigned with a color,
will not be assigned with any other color during the coloring process. However, an
adversary may be powerful enough to modify the assigned color of a captured node.
During the coloring process, a node remains in one of the following three states:
i) UnColored : Nodes that are not assigned with any color are in UnColored state.
At the time of deployment, all nodes other than the predefined Initiators are
in UnColored state.
ii) Coloring : A node is in Coloring state, when it is in the process of acquiring
color from an Initiator node.
iii) Colored : A node after obtaining color, changes its state to Colored. In this
state, the node will act as an Initiator.
A node during its lifetime changes its state from: UnColored → Coloring → Colored.
The Initiator assigns color to only those neighboring nodes that are in Uncolored
state. During the coloring process, the Initiator locally broadcasts a color request
message. Let A be the Initiator. The color request message broadcast by node A
is shown below
A −→ ∗ :< ColReq,A,RA, SIGSKA(A|RA) >
where ColReq indicates the message type, A is the ID of the initiator node, RA is a
nonce chosen by the Initiator, and SIGSKA(A|RA) is the signature of the Initiator,
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signed using its secret key. We refer to the above message type in the remaining
text as ColReq.
Neighboring nodes of the Initiator on receiving a ColReq message respond with
a color reply message, depending on their states. When an Uncolored node receives
multiple ColReq messages from its neighboring Initiators, it selects an Initiator on
first-come-first-serve basis and participates in the coloring process. There are three
types of color reply message. Let a node B be the neighbor of Initiator A. Then,
node B responds with one of the following color reply message, depending on its
state:
i) Node B in Colored state: Node B responds with the following color reply
message
B −→ A :< ColRep,B,ColorB, InitiatorB, RB,
SIGSKB (B|ColorB|InitiatorB|RA) >
where ColRep represents the message type, B is the ID of the replying node,
ColorB is the color of the replying node, InitiatorB is the ID of the Initiator
of replying node, RB is a nonce chosen by the replying node, and SIGSKB
(B|ColorB| InitiatorB|RA) is a signature signed using replying node’s se-
cret key. We refer the above message type in the remaining of the text as
ColRep(ColorB, InitiatorB).
ii) Node B in Uncolored state: The color reply message from node, B is of the
following type
B −→ A :< ColRep,B,Null, ColKey,RB, SIGSKB (B|ColKey|RA) >
where Null indicates that no color is assigned to the replying node, ColKey
is the key value assigned to the replying node prior to its deployment, RB
is a nonce chosen by the replying node, and SIGSKB (B|ColKey|RA) is a
signature signed using replying node’s secret key. We refer the above message
type in the remaining text as ColRep(Null).
iii) Node B in Coloring state: In this state, the replying node B is in the process
of acquiring its color from another Initiator other than the Initiator, A. In
this scenario, node B responds with the following color reply message
B −→ A :< ColRep,B,Hold, SIGSKB (B|RA) >
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where Hold indicates that the replying node B is in the process of acquiring
color from another Initiator. We refer to the above color reply message in the
remaining text as ColRep(Hold).
The Initiator on receiving color reply message, from its neighbors in Colored state
verifies the authenticity of colors assigned to them. For color verification, the Ini-
tiator broadcasts a color verification message within its two-hop neighbor. For
example, the Initiator A, on receiving color reply message from a neighboring node,
say B, in Colored state broadcasts the following color verification message within
its two-hop neighbor:
A −→ ∗ :< ColV er,A,B,ColorB, InitiatorB, RA,
SIGSKA(A|B|ColorB|InitiatorB|RA) >
where ColVer represents the message type, ColorB and InitiatorB are the color and
Initiator ’s ID of the node under verification, RA is a nonce chosen by the Initiator,
and SIGSKA(A|B|ColorB| InitiatorB|RA) is a signature signed using Initiator ’s
secret key.
On receiving color verification message, nodes within two-hop neighbor of the
Initiator A, verify the assigned color to node B, i.e., ColorB, as well as its initiator,
i.e., InitiatorB. On successful verification, the Initiator of node B sends a color
acknowledgement message, ColAck, to node A. If, a node within two-hop neighbor
of the Initiator A, detects a conflict either with the assigned color to node B and/or
with its initiator, then it broadcasts a revocation message for B. Thereafter node
B is revoked from the network. The node revoked from the network is no more
considered as the neighbor of any node.
After receiving ColAck message for all neighboring nodes in Colored state, the
Initiator starts coloring its neighbors. First, it checks whether two or more Colored
neighbors are sharing the same color. If so, then one of them is randomly selected
and recorded as neighbor in the neighbor table. Then, the remaining colored neigh-
bors sharing the same color are logically disconnected. After recording the nodes in
the Colored state, the nodes in UnColored state are assigned with a color such that
it is unique within one-hop neighbor of the Initiator. On completion of color assign-
ment process, the Initiator sends a color assigned message to each of its neighbor.
The color assigned message is of two types. They are:
i) If the Initiator, for example A, assigned a color, say colorB to node B, then
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the color assigned message is of the following type:
A −→ B :< ColAsg,A,ColorB, SIGSKA(A|ColorB|RB) >
We refer to the above type of color assigned message in the remaining text as
ColAsg(ColorB). The node B on receiving ColAsg(ColorB) message from A
updates its neighbor table. Node A becomes the Colored neighbor of B.
ii) If the Initiator, for example A could not assign a color to an Uncolored node
B, then the color assigned message from A to B is of the following type:
A −→ B :< ColAsg,A,Null, SIGSKA(A|RB) >
where Null indicates that the color assignment process between A and B is
unsuccessful. We refer to the above type of color assigned message in the
remaining text as ColAsg(Null). The node B on receiving ColAsg(Null) mes-
sage from A discards the message and logically disconnects itself from A. In
this case, node A and B do not communicate with each other, even though
they are neighbors.
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Figure 5.1: All neighbors have distinct color.
The following four scenarios exist between the Initiator and its neighboring nodes
during the coloring process:
Scenario 1: All neighbors of the Initiator are in Colored state.
The following two cases may arise in this scenario: Case 1 : All neighbors have
distinct color. This is depicted in Figure 5.1. Case 2 : Two or more neighbors have
same color. This case is depicted in Figure 5.2. Node coloring process in the above
two cases are explained below.
Case 1: All neighbors have distinct color.
Initiator on receiving a color reply message say, ColRep(ci, Initiatori) from node
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Figure 5.2: Two or more neighbors have same color.
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Figure 5.3: All neighbors of the Initiator are in Uncolored state.
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Figure 5.4: Neighboring node C,D, and E of Initiator A, are in Colored state, while
B and F are in UnColored state.
i, records it as a colored neighbor in its neighbor table and sends a ColAsg(ci) to
it. In Figure 5.1, the Initiator A, records the nodes B,C,D,E and F as its colored
neighbors in its neighbor table.
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Figure 5.5: The Initiator, A, has the neighbor D, and E in Colored state, B and C
in UnColored state and F in Coloring state.
Case 2: Two or more neighbors have same color.
In this case, Initiator will receive at least two ColRep messages, say ColRep(ci,
Initiatori) and ColRep(cj , Initiatorj) from node i and j respectively such that
ci = cj . When two or more nodes report with the same color, then the Initiator
selects a node at random and records it as a colored neighbor in its neighbor table
and sends a ColAsg(ci) message. To the remaining nodes, it sends a ColAsg(Null)
message and logically disconnect itself from them. In Figure 5.2, nodes D and E
have same color c3. Initiator, A, selects node D and records it as a colored neighbor
with color c3. The Initiator does not communicate directly with E; even though E
is within its communication range.
Scenario 2: All neighbors of the Initiator are in Uncolored state.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 5.3. Neighboring nodes of the Initiator respond
with a ColRep(Null) message in response to the ColReq message from the Initiator,
and then the Initiator assigns a unique color to each of the neighbors. In Figure
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5.3, the Initiator, A, on receiving ColRep(Null) messages from all neighbors, assigns
a unique color to each of them from its color pool, CLR.
Scenario 3: A few neighbors of the Initiator are in Colored state, while the rest
are in Uncolored state.
Figure 5.4 depicts this scenario. First, the nodes in the Colored state are either
successfully recorded as colored neighbors or logically disconnected as explained
in Scenario 1. Then, the nodes in UnColored state are assigned with color as in
Scenario 2. In Figure 5.4, node C,D, and E are in Colored state, whereas node B
and F are in Uncolored state. The Initiator A first records the node C, D, and E
with the color as contained in their ColRep message in its neighbor table. Then, it
assigns color to the node B and F .
Scenario 4: At least one of the neighbors of the Initiator is in Coloring state
This scenario is depicted in Figure 5.5. The Initiator waits until it receives a ColRep
message with a valid color from the nodes in Coloring state. On receiveing ColRep
message from nodes in Coloring state, it assigns color to its neighbors as in Scenario
3.
In Figure 5.5(a), node D and E are in Colored state with color c2 and c3 re-
spectively, node F is in Coloring state, and node B and C are in Uncolored state.
The Coloring node F , responds with a ColRep(Hold) message in response to ColReq
message from the Initiator A. This is shown in Figure 5.5(b). When the Initiator
A, receives the ColRep(Hold) message from F , it suspends the color assignment pro-
cess. On receiving the ColRep(c4, InitiatorF ) from F as shown in Figure 5.5(c), it
assigns color to all its neighboring node as shown in Figure 5.5(d). Node coloring
process is summarized in Algorithm 5.1.
Claim 5.1. An Initiator assigns a unique color to all its neighbor.
Proof. We prove this by means of contradiction. Let i be an Initiator node. Let
m and n be two nodes within the neighbor of i such that they share the same
color, i.e, Colorm = Colorn. Assume that node m is colored prior to n, and c
be the color assigned to m. After assigning the color c to m, CLRi is updated to
CLRi − {c}. When node i has to assign a color to n, it selects an existing color
from its updated color set CLRi, which does not contain the color, c. Thus, node
n cannot be assigned with the color c. This contradicts our assumption that the
Initiator assigned the same color to m and n.
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Algorithm 5.1: Node Coloring Algorithm.
Input: A node i with its set of neighbor nodes NBDi
Output: All neighbors of node i have a unique color
1 begin
2 Broadcast ColReq message to all neighbors
3 begin
4 for each v ∈ NBDi do
5 Send ColReq to v
6 end
7 Process ColRep messages of neighbors
8 begin
9 if received a ColRep(Hold) from v ∈ NBDi then
10 wait until v sends a ColRep(Col,Initiatorv) message
11 else if received a ColRep(Col, Initiatorv) from v ∈ NBDi then
12 ColoredNbr ← ColoredNbr ∪ {〈v, Col, Initiatorv〉}
13 else if received a ColRep(Null) from v ∈ NBDi then
14 UncoloredNbr ← UncoloredNbr ∪ {v}
15 Color verification of Colored neighbors
16 begin
17 for each v ∈ ColoredNbr do
18 clr ← getColor(v)
19 if clr ∈ CLRi then
20 Colorv ← clr
21 CLRi ← CLRi − {clr}
22 Send ColAsg(clr) to v
23 else
24 Send ColAsg(Null) to v
25 end
26 end
27 Assign color to UnColored neighbors
28 begin
29 for each v ∈ UncoloredNbr do
30 if CLRi 6= {∅} then
31 Colorv ← x, s.t. x ∈ CLRi
32 CLRi ← CLRi − {x}
33 Send ColAsg(x) to v
34 else
35 Send ColAsg(Null) to v
36 end
37 end
38 end
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Figure 5.6: Replica Detection.
5.2.2 Replica detection after node coloring process
A color conflict within the neighborhood of a node is detected as a replica. Nodes
with conflicting colors are revoked from the network. An adversary can deploy a
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replica at any location in the sensor network. When an adversary deploys a replica,
the following two scenarios may arise: i) The adversary might have changed the
color of the replica before deployment. In this case, the replica and its original node
have different colors, and ii) The adversary might not have changed the color of the
replica. In this case, the replica retains the same color as its original node. Figure
5.6 shows the above two situations. We explain below the replica detection in each
of the above situations.
Figure 5.6(a) shows a network, where each node is colored uniquely within its
neighborhood. In this Figure, α1, α2, ...α8 are the colors of color set CLR. Initially,
all nodes have the same color set, CLR. When a node assigns any color to its
neighbor, then that color is deleted from its CLR. The color encircled in the figure
is assigned to the node. For example, node B is assigned with color α2. Suppose
an adversary have captured a node, say B, and deployed its replica B′, into the
network. Node B and B′ have the same identity. The adversary may or may not
have changed the color of the replica B′.
i) Replica deployed with changed color : In this case, the adversary has changed
the color of the replica prior to its deployment. This situation is depicted
in Figure 5.6(b) and 5.6(c) where the replica B′ has different color than its
original node B. The color of B′ is α4 where as color of B is α2. Figure
5.6(b) shows a situation, where the replica and at least one of its neighbor
share the same color. Figure 5.6(c) shows the situation where the replica and
none of its neighbor share the same color. In the proposed scheme, replica is
detected during communication. In Figure 5.6(b), to communicate with any
of its neighbor O,P,Q, or R, the replica B′ have to specify its color and ID.
Node R has been assigned with the same color α4, as that of replica B
′. When
B′ reports its color either to R or O, a conflict with node ID is detected. Node
R has been assigned with a color α4 which conflicts with the color reported
by node B′. Node O has recorded during the color assignment process that
the color α4 is assigned to node R. On receiving color information from B
′, it
verifies that the color α4 is assigned to node R. Again a conflict with node ID
arises, and B′ is detected as a replica. Suppose the node P and Q in Figure
5.6(b) have not assigned the color α4 to any of their neighbors. This means,
the color α4 remains unused in their color set CLR. When replica B
′ reports
its color either to P or Q, a color conflict is detected, as the color α4 reported
by B′ is neither assigned by P nor by Q to any of their neighbors.
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In Figure 5.6(c), none of the neighbors of the replica B′ has the same color
as that of B′. Suppose the neighbors of B′ has not assigned the color α4 to
any of their neighbors. In the above situation B′ is detected as a replica, as
explained in the previous paragraph. If one or more neighbors of B′ have
assigned the color α4 to one of their neighbor, then a conflict with node ID
occurs. Thus, B′ is detected as a replica.
ii) Replica deployed with same color : Adversary has deployed the replica retain-
ing the same color as that of the original node. This situation is depicted in
Figure 5.6(d) and 5.6(e), where replica B′ has the same color, α2 as that of
its original node. In Figure 5.6(d), the node B′ and one of its neighbor Q has
the same color. This situation same as that in Figure 5.6(b). Hence, B′ will
be detected as a replica.
In Figure 5.6(e), the replica B′ and its neighbors does not share the same
color. This situation is similar to that shown in Figure 5.6(c). Hence, B′ will
be detected as a replica.
From i) and ii) a replica is detected, whenever it is deployed in the network with
or without changing its color.
5.3 Analysis
In this section, we evaluate our proposed technique. Parameters considered for
evaluation are: Security, Communication, and Storage overhead.
5.3.1 Security Analysis
i) In the proposed scheme, Identity-based signature scheme is used for message
authentication. Therefore, a node’s identity cannot be forged. Moreover,
Identity-based signature scheme incurs significantly lower computation over-
head in comparison to other signature based schemes. Therefore, it is suitable
for resource-constrained networks like WSN.
ii) An adversary cannot claim as an Uncolored node after being Colored. This is
because, when a node transforms itself from Uncolored to Colored state, the
ColKey of the node is replaced by its assigned color. To claim as an UnColored
node, it needs the ColKey. Since, it is not possible to restore the ColKey once
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it is replaced by its color, the adversary cannot claim as an UnColored node
after being Colored.
iii) A replica cannot act as the Initiator. This is because, during the coloring
process each node maintain a list of ColRep message it has heard. When the
Initiator have acquired a color, it must have responded with ColRep mes-
sage to its Initiator node. This message is maintained by its neighbor in their
ColRep message list. On receiving a ColReq message from the Initiator, neigh-
boring nodes verify the existence of the node identity in the ColRep message
list. Since, the replica is acting as the Initiator, its identity will not be present
in the neighbors ColRep message list.
iv) A Colored node may not act as Initiator. However, in this case, the node
cannot communicate with any other nodes in the network.
5.3.2 Detection Probability
In this section, we have computed the probability of detecting a replica. Let R
be a replica deployed in the network, and NBDR = {nbr1, nbr2,. . . , nbrd}, where
0 < d ≤ |CLR|. The replica R can be detected if one of the following conditions
are satisfied:
i) There exists a node nbri ∈ NBDR, such that Colornbri = ColorR.
ii) There exists a node nbri ∈ NBDR, such that ColorR ∈ CLRnbri .
Then, the probability of detecting a replica by a neighboring node of R is given as
Pdet = 1− [P (A).P (B)] (5.1)
where, A is an event that none of the neighbors, nbri, of R is assigned with the
color, ColorR. The probability of A is given by
P (A) =
( |CLR| − 1
|CLR|
)d
=
(
1− 1|CLR|
)d
(5.2)
B is an event that none of the neighbors, nbri, of R have the color, ColorR in their
color set CLR. The probability of B is given by
5.3 Analysis 89
P (B) =
(
d
|CLR|
)d
(5.3)
Using Equation 5.2 and 5.3 in Equation 5.1 we get
Pdet = 1−
[(
1− d|CLR|
)
.
d
|CLR|
]d
(5.4)
where, Pdet represents the detection probability of a node, given the value of d and
|CLR|.
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Figure 5.7: Detection probability vs. Average degree of the node.
The Figure 5.7 shows the detection probability by varying the average degree
d, of a node. It is observed from the figure that the detection probability rapidly
approaches to one with the increase in d and color set size as well.
5.3.3 Communication and Storage Overhead
In this section, we compute the overall communication and storage overhead asso-
ciated with the NCBRD technique. The number of messages exchanged during the
coloring process is the sum of ColReq broadcast by an Initiator node, the number
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of ColRep messages from neighbors to the Initiator, and the number of ColVer and
ColAsg messages from Initiator to its neighbors. Therefore,
Total number of messages exchanged per Initiator = 3d+ 1
Since, every node in the network can act as an Initiator, the overall communication
overhead is
Communication Overhead = Number of messages exchanged
per Initiator in the Network
= N.(3d+ 1)
= O(N.d) (5.5)
For detecting a replica in NCBRD, node uses a color set, CLR, to assign color to
its neighbor, where size of CLR ≈ d. Therefore, the storage overhead associated
with NCBRD is O(d).
Table 5.2: Simulation Parameters.
Parameter Value
Network 1000 x 1000 m2
Network size (N) 1000 – 10000
Deployment type Uniformly random
Communication range 55 meter
Maximum packet size 20 bytes
Average number of neighbors 40
Number of pre-colored Initiators 5% of N
Simulation Time 400 sec
5.4 Simulation and Results
We have simulated the proposed scheme using Castalia-3.2 [54] simulator, that runs
on the top of Omnet++ [55]. Parameters considered for simulation are summarized
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in Table 5.2. Replicas are randomly deployed. We considered the following param-
eters of interest: i) Coloring time, ii) Link loss percentage, iii) Number of replicas
detected, and iv) Number of packets sent/received.
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Figure 5.8: Detection probability vs. Network size between theoretical value and
simulation.
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Figure 5.11: Link loss percentage vs. Network size in NCBRD.
In Figure 5.8, we compared the detection probability vs. network size between
the theoretical value and simulated one. As expected the simulated detection prob-
ability is lesser than the theoretical value.
The plot for coloring time vs. network size is shown in Figure 5.9. Coloring
time is the time required to complete coloring process in the network. It is observed
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Figure 5.12: Total number of packets sent/received during coloring process vs. Net-
work size in NCBRD.
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Figure 5.13: Average number of packets sent/received per node during coloring
process vs. network size in NCBRD.
from the figure that for different size of color set, the coloring time remains almost
equal with increase in the network size. It is also observed that the coloring time
decreases marginally with increase in the network size due to increase in network
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density.
The coloring time depends on the number of pre-colored Initiators. The plot for
coloring time vs. number of pre-colored Initiators for a network of 1000 nodes is
shown in Figure 5.10. It is observed from the figure that the coloring time decreases
with the increase in number of pre-colored Initiators. We have observed through
simulation that the increase in coloring time is marginal when the number of pre-
colored Initiators is more than 50. The worst case coloring time is achieved when
there is only one pre-colored Initiator in the network.
In NCBRD, two neighboring nodes can communicate, if and only if the color
assignment between them is successful. For an unsuccessful color assignment, we
consider the link between the nodes does not exist, i.e, they are logically discon-
nected even though there exists a physical link. Figure 5.11 shows the percentage
of link loss vs. network size. It is observed that the link loss percentage increases
marginally with increase in the network size. It is also observed from the figure that
there is a decrease in the link loss percentage with increase in the size of color set,
for a given network size.
The plot for total packets sent/received during coloring process is shown in
Figure 5.12. It is observed from the figure that the number of packets sent/received
increases with increase in the network size. With increase in the network size, the
number of nodes in the network also increases. As a result, the total number of
packets sent/received increases.
In Figure 5.13, we plot the average number of packets sent/received per node
vs. network size during coloring process. From the figure, it is observed that
the average number of packets sent/received per node remains almost constant
irrespective of the network size and color set size |CLR|. The average number of
packets sent/received per node is independent of the |CLR|. Hence, it remains
almost constant with different size of CLR.
We varied the simulation area to 500 × 500 m2, 1000 × 1000 m2, and 2000 ×
2000 m2 to evaluate node coloring process. Size of the color set is taken to be forty
for evaluation. The comparison of link loss percentage vs. network size is shown
in Figure 5.14. It is observed from the figure that link-loss is marginally higher in
an area of size of 500 × 500 m2 and lower in 2000 × 2000 m2. Higher link-loss
is attributed to higher node density. For equal number of nodes, smaller area will
have higher node density than larger areas.
The average number of packets sent/received vs. network size for different area
size is shown in Figure 5.15. It is observed from the figure that the number of
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the simulation area size.
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 1000  2000  3000  4000  5000  6000  7000  8000  9000  10000
N
um
be
r o
f p
ac
ke
ts 
se
nt
/re
ce
iv
ed
 p
er
 n
od
e
Network size
Area 500m X 500m
Area 1000m X 1000m
Area 2000m X 2000m
Figure 5.15: Average number of packets sent/received per node vs. Network size
varying the simulation area size.
packets sent/received is more in an area of size 500 × 500 m2. This is because,
the density of nodes will be higher in a smaller area than larger area for the same
number of nodes. This leads to higher node degree. As a result, the number of
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Figure 5.17: Comparison of number of replicas deployed vs. Number of replicas
detected for network size = 1000.
packets exchanged between the nodes is also higher.
The plot for coloring time vs. network size for different area size is shown in
Figure 5.16. It is observed from the figure that area of size 500 × 500 m2 have higher
coloring time in comparison to other areas. This is because of higher node density
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in a smaller area. Higher the node density more will be the collision, resulting into
more coloring time.
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Figure 5.18: Comparison of number of replicas deployed vs. Number of replicas
detected for network size = 2000.
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of number of replicas deployed vs. Number of replicas
detected for network size = 3000.
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Figure 5.20: Comparison of average number of packets sent/received per node vs.
Network size.
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of average path length (in number of hops) vs. Network
size.
Next, we made comparison of NCBRD with a few existing mechanisms such as
LSM [36], RED [32], and SET [25]. The following parameters are considered for com-
parison: i) Number of replica detected, ii) Average number of packets sent/received
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Figure 5.22: Energy consumed per node vs. Network size.
per node, iii) Average path length, and iv) Energy consumed per node.
The plot for number of replicas detected vs. number of replica deployed in
a network of size 1000, 2000 and 3000 are shown in Figure 5.17, 5.18, and 5.19
respectively. It is observed from the figure that, NCBRD is able to detect all
replicas deployed in the network. This is because, neighboring nodes of a replica
have unique colors . Once a replica is deployed in the neighborhood of a node, a
color conflict arises, which is detected as a replica.
The plot for average number of packets sent/received per node vs. network
size is shown in Figure 5.20. It is seen from the figure that the number of packets
sent/received per node is lesser in NCBRD than RED [32] and LSM [36]. However,
the number of packets sent/received per node in NCBRD is marginally higher than
SET [25]. This is because, the communication complexity of SET is O(N), whereas
in NCBRD it is O(N.d).
Figure 5.21 shows the comparison of average path length vs. network size.
Average path length of a replica detection mechanism is the average number of
hops traveled by a message in replica detection. It is observed from the figure that
NCBRD has lower average path length in comparison to other schemes. This is
because, in NCBRD, message communication in replica detection is restricted to
two-hops only. Whereas, message travels to a comparatively longer path in schemes
like LSM, RED and SET.
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Finally, the comparison for energy consumption per node in replica detection
is shown in Figure 5.22. It is observed from the figure that the energy consumed
in detecting a replica is lesser in NCBRD. This is because, in NCBRD, a replica
is detected within its neighborhood, resulting into a lesser number of messages
exchanged.
5.5 Summary
In this chaper, we proposed a node coloring based replica detection scheme called
NCBRD, for wireless sensor networks. In the proposed scheme, each node is assigned
with a color, which is unique within its neighborhood. A color conflict in NCBRD
is detected as a replica. NCBRD has lower communication and storage overhead.
We have compared NCBRD with a few existing schemes such as RED [32], LSM
[36], and SET [25]. It is observed that NCBRD outperforms the compared replica
detection mechanisms in terms of detection probability, communication, and storage
overhead. In NCBRD, the communication for replica detection is restricted to
two-hop neighbors only. Whereas the replica detection mechanism in LSM, SET,
and RED requires more than two-hop communication. Therefore, the average path
length in NCBRD is lower in comparison to LSM, SET, and RED. It is also observed
that the NCBRD have higher detection rate in comparison to other schemes. This
is because, every node keeps track of the assigned and residual colors in its color set.
This helps in detecting a color conflict within its neighborhood. Though NCBRD
has higher detection probability, it has certain disadvantages too. It is difficult
to add a new node in the network. Moreover, a smaller color set may results in
higher link-loss. This mean, more number of neighboring nodes cannot communicate
directly. In worst case, it may results into partitioned networks. To ensure minimal
link-loss the color set must be chosen judiciously.
Detecting replica in mobile wireless sensor network is more challenging than
static network. In the next chapter, we proposed a replica detection mechanism for
mobile wireless sensor networks. The proposed mechanism uses residual energy of
nodes to detect replica.
Chapter 6
Energy Based Replica Detection
Mobile wireless sensor network (MWSN) is a variation of WSN, where the sensor
nodes are mobile. Nodes move within the network to gather information. Battery
power of a mobile sensor node is relatively higher than their static counterpart.
Mobile nodes have the following advantages over static nodes: i) They can reach
closer to the target for gathering accurate data, ii) They can rearrange their position
to connect a disjoint node, and iii) They can improve the network lifetime by
load balancing. Besides, all advantages that MWSNs have, they also face various
challenges such as communication, distributive cooperative control, security etc.
[63].
Replica detection schemes proposed for static sensor networks are not applicable
for MWSNs as the sensor nodes are mobile in MWSN. A fast and robust mechanism
is necessary to detect node replication attack in MWSN. In this chapter, we propose
a distributed replica detection scheme for MWSN based on the residual energy of
nodes.
6.1 Related Works
A few of the replica detection schemes proposed for MWSN are briefly described
below.
Deng et al. [64] have proposed two distributed time-location based detection
schemes: i) Unary-Time-Location Storage and Exchange (UTLSE), and ii) Multi-
Time-Location Storage and Diffusion (MTLSD). In their schemes, each node main-
tains multiple time-location claim of the tracked nodes. When two trackers for
the same node meet each other, they exchange their claims to verify the feasibility
of location-claims. A pair of conflicting time-location claims lead to detection of
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replica.
A detection scheme based on node’s speed is proposed by Ho et al. [65]. In
their scheme, a node moving with a speed higher than the pre-defined speed limit is
detected as replica. A node that moves to a new location broadcasts the following
information to its new neighbors: i) current time, and ii) location-claim. Each
neighbor on receiving the claim message verifies the authenticity of the message. If
the message is authentic then it is forwarded to the BS. The BS periodically collects
the time and location-claim of each node and computes the speed of the node. If the
node is found to be moving at a speed higher than the pre-defined maximum speed
limit, then the node is detected as replica. This scheme uses Sequential Probability
Ratio Test to detect the replicas using their location-claims.
Deng and Xiong [57] proposed a detection mechanism based on the pair-wise key
establishment. In their scheme, a node keeps track of the number of pair-wise keys
it has established. Counting Bloom filter is used to store the count of the number
of pair-wise keys established. Nodes periodically send their Counting Bloom filter
to the BS. The BS on receiving the Counting Bloom filters update the number of
pair-wise keys established by each node in a given period. If the number of keys
established for a node exceeds a threshold value, then the BS detects it as replica.
Yu et al. [66] proposed two schemes called: i) eXtremely Efficient Detection
(XED), and ii) Efficient Distributed Detection (EDD). In XED, each pair of nodes
exchange a random number as a challenge between them. When they meet again at
some later point of time, they request for the challenge. If a node does not send or
an invalid challenge is sent to the other node, then it is detected as a replica. EDD
is based on the number of times nodes meet each other in a given time interval.
Replica is detected if the number of meetings exceed a pre-defined threshold.
The detection schemes proposed by Deng et al. [64] and Ho et al. [65] are
location-aware schemes. They use either a GPS or an efficient localization tech-
nique to determine location. Above schemes are not suitable for applications that
mainly deals with the type and frequency of an event within a known territory, in-
dependent of the event location. The sensors deployed for these applications mostly
do not have built-in location finding mechanism.
Moreover, the schemes proposed by Ho et al. [65] and Deng and Xiong [57] are
centralized in nature. There are more prone to a single point of failure. The BS
is responsible for detecting replica. Thus, BS is overloaded with additional task of
replica detection.
An adversary will be able to extract the set of challenges from captured node and
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use them in replica, in XED. Therefore, XED may not be suitable in a real world
scenario. EDD relies on the number of meetings with a node for replica detection.
It also relies on the assumption that the deployment of replicas in the network
will increase the number of meetings between the nodes. However, in a random-
mobility scenario this is true only when the number of replicas are significantly
higher than the legitimate nodes. Moreover, determining the threshold for number
of meetings between nodes to detect a replica is difficult, especially in a random-
mobility scenario.
6.2 Assumption and Model
In this section we describe the assumptions made about the network and the ad-
versary. Notations used are given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Notations.
Notations Meaning
X Identity of a node
EX Residual energy of node X
tX Time instance at node X
EX(t
X) Residual energy at node X
at the time instance tX
|| Concatenation operator
SIGX Signature of node X
N Network size
6.2.1 Network Assumptions
We made the following assumptions about the network: i) Nodes are uniformly
deployed in the sensor field, and they move freely without any hindrance, ii) The
speed at which a sensor node moves lies within the range [vmin, vmax], where vmin
and vmax are the minimum and maximum speed respectively, iii) Communication
is bidirectional, and iv) An identity-based signature scheme as mentioned in [48] is
used for message authentication.
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6.2.2 Adversary Model
We made the following assumptions about an adversary: i) She has the ability to
compromise a subset of nodes, ii) She can create as many replicas of the captured
node as she wishes, and can deploy them at various locations in the network, iii)
She cannot create a new identity for sensors, iv) Clones obey the same protocol
suite as that of its original node, and v) Adversary is powerful enough to alter both
the timestamp and/or residual energy of replicas.
6.2.3 Energy Consumption Model
The energy consumption of a sensor node in MWSN is the sum of its processor
energy function (Ecpu), transceiver energy function (Etrans), sensor energy function
(Esensor), and the mobility energy function (Emobility) [67, 68]. That is,
Etotal = Ecpu + Etrans + Esensor + Emobility (6.1)
where, Etotal is the total energy consumption of a sensor node. The processor energy
function (Ecpu) is defined by the following equation [67, 68]
Ecpu = Ecpu state + Ecpu change
=
m∑
i=1
Pcpu state(i).Tcpu state(i)
+
n∑
j=1
Ncpu change(j).ecpu change(j) (6.2)
where, Ecpu state is the cpu state energy consumption, Ecpu change is the state-
transition energy consumption, Pcpu state(i) power dissipated by state i, Tcpu state(i)
is the duration of state i,m is the number of processor states, n is the number of state
transitions, Ncpu change(j) is the frequency of state transition j, and ecpu change(j)
is the energy consumption of one-time state transition j.
The transceiver energy function is the sum of transceiver state energy consump-
tion (Etrans state) and state-transition energy consumption (Etrans change) [67, 68].
Etrans = Etrans state + Etrans change (6.3)
The transceiver state energy consumption (Etrans state) is given by
Etrans state = ETX + ERX + Eidle + Esleep + ECCA
=
NTX∑
i=1
VtrITX .
Li
R
+
NRX∑
i=1
VtrIRX .
Li
R
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+Vtr(IidleTidle + IsleepTsleep
+ICCATCCA) (6.4)
where, ETX , ERX , Eidle, Esleep, and ECCA are the energy consumption of transceiver
in transmission, reception, idle, sleep, and Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) state
respectively. Vtr is the working voltage, Ix is the electric current of state x, where
x ∈ {TX, RX, idle, sleep, CCA}, Li is the length of the ith packet received/sent,
R is the data transferring rate, and NTX and NRX are the total number of packets
transmitted and received respectively.
The state-transition energy consumption (Etrans change) is given by [67,68]
Etrans change =
n∑
j=1
Ntrans change(j).etrans change(j) (6.5)
where, Ntrans change(j) is the frequency of transition j, and etrans change(j) is the
energy consumed by the transceiver during state transition j, and n is the number
of transition.
The sensor energy function (Esensor) can be expressed as
Esensor = Eon off + Eoff on + Esensor run
= N(eon off + eoff on + VsIsTs) (6.6)
where, eon off is the one time energy consumption for switching off sensor opera-
tion, eoff on is the one time energy consumption of switching on sensor operation,
Esensor run is the energy consumption of sensing operation, Vs and Is are the work-
ing voltage and current of sensors, Ts is the time interval of sensing operation, and
N is the number of sensor on and off operations.
The mobility energy function (Emobility) can be expressed as [69]
Emobility =
p∑
i=1
e(Di, Ti)
=
n∑
i=1
V (Di, Ti).I(Di, Ti) (6.7)
where, e(Di, Ti) is the energy consumed by a node in moving a distance Di in time
Ti, V (Di, Ti) and I(Di, Ti) are the voltage and current flows respectively in a sensor
node, when it traverses a distance Di in time Ti, and p is the total number of epochs.
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6.3 Energy Based Node Replica Detection
In this section, we discuss the proposed Energy Based Replica Detection (EBRD)
scheme for MWSN. A mobile sensor node consumes energy for all operations it
perform such as actuation, transmission, computation etc. As a result, the available
residual energy of a node decreases with time. In EBRD the available residual energy
of nodes is used to detect replicas.
In EBRD, each node acts as a monitoring node for a set of nodes in the network.
That is, a node monitors a set of nodes and is monitored by a set of nodes in the
network. Nodes maintain the timestamp-residual energy pair, < t,E(t) > for the
set of nodes they monitor, where t indicates the timestamp elapsed since a node’s
deployment, and E(t) indicates the residual energy level of the node at t. The tuple
< t,E(t) > is recorded in the energy table maintained at each node. A node locally
broadcasts its timestamp-residual energy pair at regular time interval within its
one-hop neighbor. A neighboring node on receiving the timestamp-residual energy
pair from a node say X, updates its energy table provided the node X is monitored
by it. Conflict in the timestamp-residual energy pair for a node is detected as replica
by its monitoring node.
The sharing of timestamp-residual energy pair is discussed in sub-section 6.3.1
and the replica detection mechanism is discussed in sub-section 6.3.2.
6.3.1 Timestamp-Residual Energy Sharing
Timestamp is a monotonically increasing parameter whereas the residual energy of
a node decreases with time until the node dies. Nodes periodically broadcast their
timestamp-residual energy pair. This process continues until the node dies. A node
dies when its residual energy level is approximately equal to zero.
The timestamp-residual energy pair broadcast from a node X is given below:
X −→ ∗ : [ EU, X, tX , EX(tX), RX , SIGX(X||tX ||EX(tX)||RX) ] (6.8)
where EU indicates the message type and RX is a nonce chosen by node X.
A node on receiving the timestamp-residual energy pair verifies the authenticity
of the message. If the authentication fails, then the message is discarded, else its
energy table is updated. The updation of timestamp-residual energy pair and replica
detection is explained in the following section.
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6.3.2 Replica Detection
In this section, we have explained the replica detection process in detail. To il-
lustrate the replica detection process in EBRD we consider the Figure 6.1. The
associated energy table for a few nodes of interest is also shown in the figure.
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Figure 6.1: Figure to illustrate the replica detection process.
The detailed structure of the energy table is shown in Table 6.2. The Node ID
field indicates the identity of the monitored node. Time and Energy indicates the
timestamp and residual energy of the monitored node at which it has broadcasted
the timestamp-residual energy pair, respectively. Difference is the time difference
between the monitoring and monitored node at which the corresponding entry is
updated in the energy table.
For example, in Table 6.2, X is the identity of the monitored node, tX is the
time at which node X has broadcast its residual energy, EX(t
X) is the residual
energy of node X at time tX , and tY is the time at which node Y has received the
timestamp-residual energy pair from node X.
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Table 6.2: Energy table
Node ID Time Energy Difference (β)
X tX EX(t
X) tY − tX
Suppose, the node X in Figure 6.1 is monitored by node Y, P, and R. Let us
assume that node Y, P and R were in the transmission range of node X in that order
at some point of time during its trajectory in the network. The energy tables at node
Y, P, and R are shown in Figure 6.1(a). From the energy tables it implies that node
Y, P, and R have received the timestamp-residual energy pair < tX1 , EX(t
X
1 ) >, <
tX2 , EX(t
X
2 ) >, and < t
X
3 , EX(t
X
3 ) > at time t
Y , tP , and tR from node X respectively.
The time tX1 < t
X
2 < t
X
3 and the residual energy EX(t
X
1 ) > EX(t
X
2 ) > EX(t
X
3 ).
Further, assume that at time tX4 > t
X
3 , node X has broadcasted its timestamp-
residual energy pair < tX4 , EX(t
X
4 ) > and node Y is in the transmission range of
node X. The updated energy table at node Y is shown in Figure 6.1(b).
Suppose, the node X is captured and its replica is deployed in the network at
time tX5 as shown in Figure 6.1(c). Let X
′ be the replica of X. Let EX(tX5 ) and
EX′(t
X′
5 ) be the residual energy of X and X
′ respectively at tX5 .
Depending on the ability of the adversary, the following two scenarios arises: i)
The adversary will deploy the clone with maximum energy, and ii) The adversary
will modify the energy level of the captured node and/or the clone before deploy-
ment. The replica detection mechanisms in the above two scenarios are explained
below.
A. Clones are deployed with maximum energy.
An adversary may deploy a clone with maximum energy with an objective to
remain in the network for maximum period of time. Since, clones are deployed
with maximum energy, EX′(t
X
5 ) > EX(t
X
5 ). We identify the following two
cases in this scenario:
Case - I: Adversary has no capability to synchronize the clone’s clock with
the original node.
Suppose node Y is in the communication range of X ′, when X ′ broadcast
its timestamp-residual energy pair < tX
′
j , EX′(t
X′
j ) > at time t
X′
j as shown in
Figure 6.1(d). Let tXi > t
X
5 be the time instant at node X, when the clone X
′
has broadcasted its timestamp-residual energy pair. Since the clocks are not
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synchronized tXi 6= tX
′
j . Node Y performs the following actions, on receiving
the timestamp-residual energy pair from X ′:
i) If tX
′
j < t
X
4 then X
′ is detected as clone. This is because, time is a
monotonically increasing parameter and moves in the forward direction.
ii) If tX
′
j > t
X
4 and EX′(t
X′
j ) > EX(t
X
4 ) then X
′ is detected as clone. This is
because, residual energy decreases with time. For tX
′
j > t
X
4 , the residual
energy of node X should be less than EX(t
X
4 ).
iii) If tX
′
j > t
X
4 and EX′(t
X′
j ) < EX(t
X
4 ) then node Y computes the expected
time of node X as tY + β4. If |tX′j − tY | ≈ β4 then the corresponding
entry for node X in the energy table at node Y is updated. Since, clones
are deployed with maximum energy, this condition will arise only when
the timestamp-residual energy pair is received from the original node.
Case - II: Adversary has the capability to synchronize the clone’s clock with
the original node.
In this case, both the clone and its original node have almost equal clock
timings. Let tXi > t
X
5 and t
X′
j be the time instance of node X and its clone X
′
respectively. Then the condition tXi ≈ tX
′
j always holds true. Node Y performs
the following action on receiving the timestamp-residual energy pair:
i) If tX
′
j > t
X
4 and EX′(t
X′
j ) > EX(t
X
4 ) then X
′ is detected as a clone.
This is because, residual energy decreases with time. For tX
′
j > t
X
4 , the
residual energy of node X should be less than EX(t
X
4 ).
ii) If tX
′
j > t
X
4 and EX′(t
X′
j ) < EX(t
X
4 ), node Y computes the expected
residual energy of X. Let E′X be the expected residual energy of X and
is computed as follows:
E′X = EX(t
X
4 )− e ∗ (tX
′
j − tX4 ) (6.9)
where e is the minimum energy consumed by a node per unit time. The
value of e is computed using the energy model proposed by Zhou et
al. [67]. If EX′(t
X′
j ) > E
′
X , then X
′ is detected as clone, else the energy
table at node Y is updated. This is because, the clone is deployed with
maximum energy. Therefore, its residual energy level will be higher than
the expected energy level.
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Algorithm 6.1: Replica detection for node X when clones are deployed with
maximum energy
Input: Timestamp-residual energy pair < tXj , EX(t
X
j ) >
Output: Updated energy table or detected replica.
1 tXi ←− EnergyTable.getT ime(X)
2 EX(t
X
i )←− EnergyTable.getResidualEnergy(X)
3 β ←− EnergyTable.getBeta(X)
4 if tXj < t
X
i then
5 X is detected as replica
6 else
7 if EX(t
X
j > EX)(t
X
i ) then
8 X is detected as replica
9 else
10 /* tY - current time at monitoring node Y */
11 if tXj − t
Y ≈ β then
12 E′X ←− EX(t
X
i )− e ∗ (t
X′
j − t
X
i )
13 if EX(t
X
j ) > E
′
X then
14 X is detected as replica
15 else
16 updateEnergyTable(X,< tXj , EX(t
X
j ) >)
17 else
18 X is detected as replica
The detection process using above scenario is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
B. Energy levels of the captured node and/or clone is modified by the adversary.
In this scenario, the adversary attempts to deploy a clone such that the energy
levels of the clone and its original node are almost equal. The adversary may
do either of the following: i) She may recharge the captured node to maximum
energy level and deploy both the clone and its original node with maximum
energy level. However, the adversary may not adopt this strategy as it takes
longer time for charging the battery; ii) She may decrease the energy level of
the clone to nearly equal to that of the original node and deploy both at the
same energy level. The following two cases may arise in this scenario:
Case - III: Adversary deploys the clone and its original node with the maxi-
mum energy level.
In this case, clones will be detected as explained in Case - I and Case - II.
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Case - IV: Adversary decreases the energy level of the clone to nearly equal
to the original node.
To detect replica, a suspicious counter is maintained by the monitoring nodes
for each node they monitor. If the suspicious counter for a node exceeds a
threshold value, then that node is detected as replica. In EBRD, nodes pe-
riodically broadcast their timestamp-residual energy pair. Let Tupdate be the
broadcast interval between two consecutive timestamp-residual energy pair.
Suppose nodeX has broadcast its timestamp-residual energy pair at tX4 . Then
node Y expects to receive the next timestamp-residual energy update from
X at time tX = tX4 + n.Tupdate, for n ≥ 1. Since, a number of replicas are
present in the network, each one would send their timestamp-residual energy
updates periodically. Assuming that the nodes are either loosely or not syn-
chronized; the frequency of timestamp-residual energy update from X will be
higher. A monitoring node Y will increment the suspicious counter for node
X, if tX 6= tX4 + n.Tupdate. When the counter value exceeds a given threshold,
then it is detected as replica.
The detection process for the above scenario is shown in Algorithm 6.2.
Algorithm 6.2: Replica detection for node X when energy level of the cap-
tured node and/or its clone is modified by the adversary.
Input: Timestamp-residual energy pair < tXj , EX(t
X
j ) >
Output: Updated energy table or detected replica.
1 tXi ←− EnergyTable.getT ime(X)
2 EX(t
X
i )←− EnergyTable.getResidualEnergy(X)
3 if tXj < t
X
i then
4 X is detected as replica
5 else
6 if EX(t
X
j > EX)(t
X
i ) then
7 X is detected as replica
8 else
9 if tXj 6= (t
X
j + k.Tupdate) then
10 X.suspectCount←− X.suspectCount+ 1
11 if X.suspectCount > suspectThreshold then
12 X is detected as replica
13
14 else
15 updateEnergyTable(X,< tXj , EX(t
X
j ) >)
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Case - V: Adversary has the ability to synchronize the clock with the original
node, and also decrease the energy level of the clone nearly equal to the origi-
nal node.
To detect a clone in this case, a monitoring node maintains k recently received
timestamp-residual energy pair from each of the node it monitors. That is, if
node A is monitored by node B, then the node B stores a timestamp-residual
energy vector of length k for node A. This vector contains k recently received
timestamp-residual energy pair from node A. We denote this vector as BA.
Each element of the vector BA stores the timestamp-residual energy pair re-
ceived from node A. Let BAi denotes the i
th element of the vector BA, and
BAi .T and B
A
i .E denotes the corresponding timestamp and residual energy
respectively at BAi . When two nodes meet each other, they exchange the
identity of nodes they monitor. If there exists one or more nodes monitored
by both, then the vector associated with those nodes are also exchanged. A
conflict in the timestamp-residual energy vector corresponding to a node at
two different monitoring nodes is detected as a replica.
For example, suppose node A,B,C, and D are monitored by X, and D,E, F,
and G are monitored by Y . When X and Y meet each other, they exchange
the identity of their monitored nodes. Since, the node D is monitored by both,
the vector XD and Y D corresponding to D at X and Y respectively are also
exchanged. Every element of XD is compared with every other element of Y D
at both X and Y . If a conflict is detected between any pair of elements, then
D is detected as replica. In other word, D is detected as replica if any one of
the following conditions hold true.
(i) XDi .T = Y
D
j .T and X
D
i .E 6= Y Dj .E
(ii) XDi .T < Y
D
j .T and X
D
i .E < Y
D
j .E
(iii) XDi .T > Y
D
j .T and X
D
i .E > Y
D
j .E
for any i, j ≤ k
This is because, if there exists only one node in the network, then the timestamp-
residual energy pair broadcast by the node at any instant of time will always
be same for every monitoring node receiving the broadcast message. There
cannot be different images of the same timestamp-residual energy pair for
different monitoring nodes. Algorithm 6.3 summarizes the above scenario of
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replica detection.
Algorithm 6.3: Replica detection for node D at node X when nodes are
synchronized and energy level of the captured node and/or its clone is modified
by the adversary.
Input: Timestamp-residual energy vector Y D from node Y .
Output: Node D is a replica or no operation.
1 XD ←− Energy Table.getEnergyV ector(D)
2 for i← 1 to k do
3 for j ← 1 to k do
4 if (XDi .T = Y
D
j .T ) && (X
D
i .E 6= Y
D
j .E) then
5 X is detected as replica
6 exit
7 if (XDi .T < Y
D
j .T ) && (X
D
i .E < Y
D
j .E) then
8 X is detected as replica
9 exit
10 if (XDi .T > Y
D
j .T ) && (X
D
i .E > Y
D
j .E) then
11 X is detected as replica
12 exit
13
14 no operation
15 exit
6.4 Analysis
We claim the following:
Claim 6.1. If tXdep and t
X′
dep are the deployment time of a node X, and its clone X
′
respectively, then the condition EX′(t) > EX(t) for t ≥ tX′dep > tXdep is always true.
Proof. Let
t = tXdep + δt
X , and (6.10)
t = tX
′
dep + δt
X′ (6.11)
Since, the replica X ′ is deployed after X, therefore, tXdep < t
X′
dep. Let
tX
′
dep = t
X
dep + δtdiff (6.12)
The residual energy of node X and X ′ at time tXdep and t
X′
dep respectively can be
computed using Equation 6.10 and 6.11 as
EX(t) = EX(t
X
dep)− EcX(δtX)
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EX(t
X
dep) = EX(t) + E
c
X(δt
X) (6.13)
Also,
EX′(t) = EX′(t
X′
dep)− EcX′(δtX
′
)
EX′(t
X′
dep) = EX′(t) + E
c
X′(δt
X′) (6.14)
Now, using Equation 6.10 and 6.11, we can write
tXdep + δt
X = tX
′
dep + δt
X′
⇒ tXdep + δtX = tXdep + δtdiff + δtX
′
[ Using Equation 6.12 ]
⇒ δtX = δtX′ + δtdiff
⇒ δtX > δtX′ [δtdiff > 0 ]
⇒ EcX(δtX) > EcX′(δtX
′
)
⇒ EcX(δtX) − EcX′(δtX
′
) > 0 (6.15)
Since, nodes have equal energy at the time of its deployment, i.e., EX(t
X
dep) =
EX′(t
X′
dep)
⇒ EX(t) + EcX(δtX) = EX′(t) + EcX′(δtX
′
)
⇒ EX′(t) = EX(t) + EcX(δtX)
−EcX′(δtX
′
)
[ Using Equation 6.13 ]
⇒ > EX(t) (6.16)
[ Using Equation 6.15]
Proved.
6.4.1 Detection Probability
In this section, we analyze the probability of replica detection in EBRD. Let N
be the network size, r be the number of replicas deployed in the network and the
number of monitoring nodes any node is k. The probability of a node meeting a
replica, Pmeet, is equal to
Pmeet =
r
N
(6.17)
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In EBRD, a replica is detected by the monitoring nodes. The probability Pdet of
detecting a replica is given by
Pdet = Pr[ at least one of the k monitoring nodes meet a replica]
= 1− Pr[ none of the k monitoring nodes meet a replica]
= 1−
(
k
0
)
(Pmeet)
0
.(1− Pmeet)k
= 1− (1− Pmeet)k
= 1−
(
1− r
N
)k
[ Using Equation 6.17 ]
≈ 1− exp− rkN (6.18)

6.4.2 Communication and Storage Overhead
In EBRD, each node periodically broadcasts its residual energy within one-hop
neighbor. Total number of messages broadcast in a periodic interval isN . Therefore,
the communication complexity of this scheme is O(N). The storage overhead of
EBRD depends on the number of monitoring nodes. According to the Birthday
Paradox,
√
N number of nodes are required, so that a node is monitored by at least
two nodes [37]. Through simulation, we observed that
√
N
2
number of monitoring
nodes are sufficient to successfully detect replicas. Also, detection probability do
not change with increase in the number of monitoring nodes beyond
√
N
2
. Therefore,
the upper bound on storage overhead is O(
√
N). The comparison of communication
and storage overhead of existing replica detection schemes in MWSN is shown in
Table 6.3.
6.5 Simulation Results
We have simulated using Castalia-3.2 [54] simulator, that runs on Omnet++ sim-
ulation environment [55]. Parameters considered for simulation are summarized in
Table 6.4. We have assumed that replicas are randomly deployed by the adversary.
EBRD is simulated with two variants: i) Replicas are deployed with maximum en-
ergy, and we call this as EBRD1; ii) Replicas are deployed with energy nearly equal
to the residual energy of original node; we call this as EBRD2. We have compared
the performance of both EBRD1 and EBRD2 with a few existing schemes namely
EDD [66] and MTLSD [64]. Metrics considered for evaluating the performance are:
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Table 6.3: Comparison of communication and storage overhead.
Schemes Type Communication Storage
XED [66] Distributed O(1) O(N)
EDD [66] Distributed O(1) O(N)
UTLSE &
Distributed O(N) O(
√
N)
MTLSD [64]
Ho et al. [65] Centralized O(N
√
N) O(N)
Deng et al. [57] Centralized O(N
√
N) -
EBRD Distributed O(N) O(
√
N)
Table 6.4: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Area 1000 x 1000 m2
Network size 100 – 1000
Deployment type Uniformly random
Communication range 20 meter
Pause time 5 sec
Node movement Random way-point mobility model
Node speed range 2 to 10 meter/sec
Simulation time 800 sec
i) detection probability, ii) detection time, iii) number of packets sent/received,
and iv) energy consumed per node.
The comparison of detection probability vs. network size is shown in Tables
6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 for 5, 10 and 20 number of replicas respectively. From the above
tables it is observed that both EBRD1 and EBRD2 have higher detection probability
in comparison to EDD and MTLSD. This is because, in EBRD the deployment of
replicas results a conflict in the timestamp-residual energy pair of the captured node
and this conflict is successfully detected by its monitoring nodes. However, in EDD
and MTLSD, it depends on the threshold value of the number of times nodes meet
each other, and node speed respectively. In EDD, replica detection depends on the
number of meetings, which may vary with network density and node movement.
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Detection Probability vs. Network size for the number of
replicas equal to Five.
Network size
Detection Probability
EDD MTLSD EBRD1 EBRD2
100 0.92 1 1 1
200 0.92 1 1 1
300 0.80 1 1 0.84
400 0.80 1 1 0.96
500 0.80 1 1 0.92
600 0.80 0.90 1 0.96
700 0.76 0.90 1 0.84
800 0.60 0.90 1 0.96
900 0.60 0.80 1 0.96
1000 0.60 0.80 1 0.96
Table 6.6: Comparison of Detection Probability vs. Network size for the number of
replicas equal to Ten.
Network size
Detection Probability
EDD MTLSD EBRD1 EBRD2
100 0.90 1 1 1
200 0.90 1 1 1
300 0.90 1 1 0.96
400 0.90 1 1 0.90
500 0.80 1 1 0.96
600 0.80 0.90 1 0.94
700 0.70 0.90 1 0.94
800 0.70 0.90 1 0.96
900 0.70 0.90 1 0.94
1000 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.94
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Table 6.7: Comparison of Detection Probability vs. Network size for the number of
replicas equal to Twenty.
Network size
Detection Probability
EDD MTLSD EBRD1 EBRD2
100 1 1 1 1
200 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.96
300 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.90
400 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.89
500 0.90 0.90 1 0.90
600 0.85 0.8 0.95 0.90
700 0.8 0.85 0.95 0.95
800 0.82 0.82 1 0.94
900 0.78 0.82 0.95 0.91
1000 0.78 0.8 0.95 0.91
In our simulation, we observed that a node meets another node for a maximum of
fifteen number of times for a period of simulation run. Simulation is divided into
number of periods. Each period is of 100 seconds. Therefore, we set the threshold
value for the number of meetings in EDD to be fifteen. At this threshold value, we
observed that the detection probability of EDD is lower than EBRD. In MTLSD,
the threshold value to detect replica is the node speed, which is computed using
the nodes last two consecutive locations. If the replicas move closer to the original
node, then the calculated node speed may not exceed the maximum speed limit. As
a result, the detection probability is marginally lower in MTLSD.
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 shows the plot for clone detection time vs. network size of
EBRD1 and EBRD2 respectively. We have defined the clone detection time as the
time to detect the first clone after its deployment. It is observed from the figure that
for a given network size, the detection time decreases with increase in the number
of clones. This is because, as the number of clones increases, the probability that a
clone meet its monitoring node at the earliest time also increases. This results in the
decrease of clone detection time. With increase in the number of nodes, the number
of monitoring nodes for a given node also increases. As a result the probability of
meeting a clone with its monitoring node at the earliest time also increases. This
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Figure 6.2: Detection time vs. Network size for EBRD1.
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Figure 6.3: Detection time vs. Network size for EBRD2.
contribute to the marginal decrease in detection time.
The plot for detection probability vs. time is shown in Figure 6.4. This shows
the response of each scheme in detecting a clone. From the figure it is observed
that the time to detect a clone is significantly lesser in EBRD1 compared to EDD,
MTLSD, and EBRD2. This is because, when a clone is deployed with maximum
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Figure 6.5: Average number of packets sent/received per epoch vs. Network size.
energy, its conflicting timestamp-residual energy pair is immediately detected by
the monitoring node. EDD needs number of meetings with a node over a period
to detect replica. In MTLSD, the diffusion of location-claim within tracker nodes
requires comparatively more time than EBRD1. In EBRD2, a node is detected
as replica when the suspicious counter value of that node reaches the maximum
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threshold. This requires relatively more amount of time than EBRD1.
Figure 6.5 shows the average number of packets sent/received by a node per
epoch vs. network size. We have considered an epoch as defined in [64, 70]. It is
observed from the figure that the average number of packets sent/received per epoch
in both EBRD1 and EBRD2 is higher than EDD and lower than MTLSD. This is
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because, the number of timestamp-residual energy pairs broadcast per epoch is lower
than the number of messages exchanged for diffusion of time-location claim among
the tracker nodes in MTLSD, and higher than the number of local connectivity
messages per epoch in EDD.
The energy consumed per node in detecting a replica is shown in Figure 6.6.
It is observed from the figure that EDD has the lowest energy consumption per
node in replica detection. This is because, the energy consumption is proportional
to communication overhead. As communication overhead of EBRD is higher than
EDD and lower than MTLSD, the energy consumption of EBRD is higher than
EDD and lower than MTLSD. It is also observed that the energy consumption in
EBRD2 is higher than EBRD1 due to the additional exchange of timestamp-energy
vector among the monitoring nodes.
Finally, the plot for false positive vs. network size is shown in Figure 6.7. It is
observed that the schemes considered for comparison have almost zero false positive
except EDD which have some cases of false positives for network size from 100 to
300.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a distributed replica detection scheme called energy
based replica detection (EBRD). It is based on the residual energy level of nodes. As
the time progresses the residual energy level of a node decreases. In EBRD each node
is monitored by a set of nodes and each node also act as a monitoring node to a set
of nodes. Replica is detected by the monitoring nodes. Conflict in the timestamp-
residual energy pair of a node at the monitoring node is detected as replica. The
proposed scheme is compared with EDD and MTLSD. The simulation results have
shown that EBRD has detection probability higher than ninety percent. This shows
that the residual energy level of a node can used to detect replica. The periodic
broadcast of residual energy by each node is the only additional communication
overhead incurred by EBRD. This communication overhead is significantly lower
than MTLSD. But, it is higher than that of EDD which uses only the hello broadcast
among the neighbors. The energy consumption is EBRD is relatively higher, because
of the additional communication overhead in periodic broadcast of residual energy.
This additional communication overhead and energy consumption can be reduced,
if the residual energy is broadcasted along with the hello message.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Work presented in this thesis focuses on the detection of node replication attack
in WSN. Most of the replica detection schemes require exchange of information
among the nodes. This necessitates an efficient mechanism for information exchange
among the nodes. In this thesis, we proposed the followings: i) a mechanism for
exchanging group membership information among the nodes, ii) a zone-based, and
a node coloring based replica detection scheme for static WSN, and iii) an energy
based replica detection scheme for mobile WSN.
We briefly summarize below the original contributions of this thesis, and also
highlight the scope for future work.
7.1 Contributions
Nodes exchange their group membership identities for various purpose such as clus-
ter formation, clone detection etc. For a larger and dense network, the exchange of
group membership identities is an expensive process. Existing schemes make use of
Bloom filter for exchanging membership information. Although, the Bloom filter is
memory efficient yet, it suffers from higher probability of false positives. A node
may be detected as a member of a group, when it is not a member of that group. In
this thesis, we proposed two mechanisms called Transpose Bit-Pair Coding (TBC),
and Sub-Mat Coding (SMC) for exchanging group membership information. In
the above schemes, a bit-stream is generated from the membership matrix. This
bit-stream is used for exchanging membership information among the nodes. The
number of bits generated is significantly smaller than the size of membership matrix.
The performance of TBC and SMC are compared with two trivial schemes and
Bloom filter. It was observed that TBC and SMC do not generate false positive,
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and the space saving percentage is significantly higher compared to Bloom filter.
This is because, TBC and SMC are deterministic schemes, whereas Bloom filter is
a probabilistic scheme. SMC achieves better space saving percentage than TBC.
This is because, SMC efficiently utilizes the sparseness of the membership matrix
than TBC. However, the space saving percentage of TBC and SMC decreases, as
the group size increases. In the worst case, the size of the bit-stream will be closer
to the size of the membership matrix. The proposed scheme requires a bit matrix
to store the membership information. Size of the bit matrix is less than the storage
overhead associated with other mechanisms that uses the standard format to store
membership identities.
Most of the node replica detection schemes that are reported in the literature
are location dependent. They use probabilistic approach to forward the location
claim. It is difficult to guarantee a clone-free sensor network using probabilistic
claim forwarding approach. Location dependent schemes required either GPS en-
abled node or localization technique to determine node’s position. A GPS enabled
node increases the network cost. Whereas, a localization technique increases com-
putational and storage overhead. Location independent schemes can reduce the cost
and computational overhead associated with location dependent schemes.
Zone-based node replica detection (ZBNRD), Node Coloring Based Replica De-
tection (NCBRD), Energy Based Replica Detection schemes proposed in this thesis
are location independent.
In ZBNRD, network is divided into number of zones. Each zone has a zone-leader
and they are responsible for replica detection. It was observed that the ZBNRD
have higher detection probability compared to other schemes. This is because, a
node belongs to exactly one zone. Existence of node identity in more than one
zone is detected as replica. Though ZBNRD has higher detection probability, it has
some limitations. Communication overhead of ZBNRD increases for higher number
of zones, and for larger network size. The end-to-end delay increases, when the
number of zones are smaller.
In NCBRD, each node is assigned with a color, which is unique within their
neighborhood. A color conflict in NCBRD is detected as a replica. NCBRD out-
performs schemes such as RED [32], LSM [36], and SET [25] in terms of detection
probability, communication, and storage overhead. Coloring and detection mecha-
nism is performed within two-hop neighbors; therefore, the average path length in
NCBRD is lower than other schemes. NCBRD has following disadvantages: i) It is
not possible to add a new node at a later point of time, ii) a small color set may
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result in the loss of neighboring links, and may partition the network. To ensure
minimal link-loss, the color set must be chosen judiciously.
The above two schemes for replica detection are for static WSN. They cannot
be used in MWSN due to node mobility. Energy Based Replica Detection (EBRD)
scheme is proposed for MWSN. This scheme is based on the residual energy level
of nodes. Each node in EBRD is monitored by a set of nodes, and also acts as a
monitoring node to a set of nodes. Replica is detected by the monitoring nodes.
Conflict in the timestamp-residual energy pair of a node at the monitoring node
is detected as replica. The proposed scheme is compared with EDD and MTLSD.
It was observed that the EBRD has the detection probability nearly equal to one.
Though EBRD has higher detection probability, yet it suffers from higher commu-
nication overhead, and has higher detection time than comparative schemes. There
is no significant improvement in energy consumption per node.
7.2 Future Directions of Research
We briefly outline the possible future extensions to our work.
The encoding and decoding process of TBC and SMC can be improved further to
save space without generating false positives. New data structures may be suggested
which will require lesser number of bits to store group membership information.
The communication path length among the zone-leaders in ZBNRDmay increase
if the number of zones in the network are relatively less. Therefore, a suitable model
is needed to optimize the number of zones and path length. Selecting an efficient
storage mechanism such as the digest mentioned in [44] may reduce the storage cost.
The NCBRDmechanism can be extended further to establish a trade-off between
link-loss percentage and storage cost. The provision for inclusion of new nodes into
the network after the coloring process is not considered in NCBRD. A secured
mechanism for introducing a new node into the network after coloring process will
make the scheme more realistic.
The energy-update mechanism in EBRD can be further modified to reduce the
communication cost. A new energy depletion model can be proposed to compute
the expected residual energy of a node, more accurately.
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